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GO ANY'wHERE WE · DAMN WELL PLE ASE 
THE AME'RICAN NAVAL PRESEN CE'. 
I N THE MEDITERR Al\f£Jl.N 
BY 
MAUREEN 1-1:ELVIN SOWP, 
1-i Tf-IBSIS SUBMITTED IN PARTI.IH., FULF I LLi·1!ENT OF THE 
REQUIRE.:J1.iENTS .FOR Tf-iE DEGREE 
MA STER OF ARTS 
IN 
ABSTRACT 
Freedom of the seas is one of the oldest policies 
... of the United States. · We demand the right to 
go anywhere anytime. It is nobody's damn business 
where we go. We shall go anywhere we please .... 
Admiral Bull Halsey 
August 29, 1946 
Naples, Italy 
The presence of the United States Sixth Fleet in the 
Mediterranean is an accepted fact of diplomatic life. The 
ships and planes of the U. S. Navy represent American inte-
rests in such diverse countries as Egypt, Israel, Greece, 
and Turkey. That this force is of relatively recent origin 
is often obscured by the unquestioning acceptance of a global 
mission for the United States Navy. Such was -not always 
the case. 
I0 the immediate post-World War Two period, the 
United States possessed the strongest maritime force in the 
world; nevertheless, despite its superiority, the United 
States Navy was, at this time, fighting for its very ex-
istence. The development and utilization of the atomic 
bomb had apparently destroyed the premise upon which rested 
the rationale for a strong Navy. The intense and bitter 
unification controversy furthe r undermined naval support. 
By 1946, the U. S. Navy was viewed by many as an expensive, 
ii 
iii 
obsolete "military dinosaur." 
The actual commitment to create a large, standing 
naval force in the Mediterranean grew out of the conjunc-
tion of a complex set of perceptions of and responses to 
Soviet activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and a need 
by naval leaders to acquire a viable mission for the Navy 
in an era when traditional military strategy and foreign 
policy were dis tor ted by the atomic bomb. The upheaval 
caused by World War Two had created a s er ious political 
vacuum throughout the world. At the war's end, the United 
States perceived an existing power void in the Mediterranean; 
saw this vacuum as a threat to her national interests, and, 
accordingly, took steps to meet the challenge. 
This thesis explores and examines those political 
and military actions taken by the United State _s to secure 
its hegemony in the Mediterranean area out of which resulted 
the establishment of the U. S. Sixth Fleet, both sy mbol 
and substance of American power in that area. Utilizing 
contemporary sources, it delineates the impact of such a 
naval commitment on United States-Soviet relations in the 
immediate postwar period and exposes the broader implications 
of such naval activity for United States global foreign 
policy. 
This thesis further argues th at the creation of the 
U. S. Sixth Fleet resulted from the overlap and interplay 
of: (1) the g_ obal naval policy envis ioned by the Secretary 
iv 
of the Navy, James V. Forrestal, which required a positive 
demonstration of the efficacy of a nav~l response to in-
creasing Soviet activity in Europe; (2) the quest for a 
rationale upon which to build a postwar Navy . consistent 
with the realities of the Atomic Age which led many pro-
minent naval partisans to seek a theater i n which to prove 
the Navy's worth. The decision to dispatch the USS Missouri 
in April 1946 and the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt in Septem-
ber of the same year provided just such a stage, and was 
the pivotal point at which these two motivations--advancing 
the interests of the United States and those . of the U. S. 
Navy- -i ntersected and overlapped. 
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I NTRODUCTION 
The Mediterranean is the Helen among oceans. Like 
her it was desired by all who saw it fought over not 
for ten but for two thousand years, and captured by the 
boldest . 1 
"Mediterranean" is etymologically deriv -ed from the 
Latin, meaning "in the middle of the land. 11 This is pre -
cisely where the Mediterranean lies, strategically situated 
with Europe to the North, Asia to the East, and Africa to 
the South. Small in comparison with the world's two great 
oceans, the Mediterranean Sea is, nevertheless, formidable. 
The Sea measures 2,200 miles from the Straits of Gibraltar 
to Iskendrun, Turkey; it has a width of 600 miles, is over 
16,000 feet deep in several locations, and occupies an area 
of over 169,000 square miles . 2 For example, an American 
aircraft carrier, traveling at twenty - five knots (nautical 
miles per hour), would take three days and nine hours to 
reach Istanbul, Turkey from Gibraltar. A Soviet Kresta II 
class guided missile cruiser coming from the Black Sea has 
a trip of 814 miles to Port Said, Egypt, the entrance to the 
Suez Canal. The nation which controls the three main 
1Jesse W. Lewis, J r., The Strategic Balance in the 
Mediterranean (Washington: American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Research, 1976), p. 1 
2 World Book Encycloped ia, 1980 ed., s.v . "Mediter-
rane an Sea . 11 
1 
2 
po ints of passage--the Straits of Gibraltar at the western end 
of the Sea, the Suez Canal connecting the Mediterranean with 
the Red Sea and eventually with the Indian Ocean, and the 
Turkish Straits 3, the pathway between the Black Sea and the 
Mediterranean--effectively controls the entire Sea. 
The Mediterranean can be viewed as the crucible of 
world politics. Over the centuries, great powers have 
circled each other in the Mediterranean --each attempting 
. 
to enhance their relative position while implicitly chal-
lenging the other to seize the advantage. Some of the 
world's great battles have raged there, battles which de-
cided the direction of world history. However, the Medi-
terranean is more than an arena for super-power confron-
·tations. It is the geographical, commercial, religious, 
social, and most importantly, strategic junction of three 
continents. The challenges, opportunities, and risks con-
commitan~ with a mixture of conflicting interests and op-
tions, invariably create a political vacuum. Following 
the end of World War Two, the United States perceived an 
3The Turkish Straits consist of the Dardanelles, 
the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosphorus. The Dardanelles, 
leading from the Aegean Sea into the Sea of Marmara, are 
ab out 35 nautical miles long and about 2 nautical miles 
wide. The Sea of Marmara, connecting the Aegean in the 
West through the Dardanelles and the ~lack Sea i n the East 
through the Bosphorus, is about 110 nautical miles long and 
4 0 nautical miles wide . The Bosphorus is about 17 nautical 
miles long and fro m Boo yards to l l/2 nautical miles wide. 
These d i mensi on pe rmit easy defense of the waterway . Control 
3 
existing power void in the Mediterranean; saw this void as 
both a threat to maintenance of her national interests and 
an opportunity for the expansion of American global hege-
mony. Accordingly, the United States took positive steps 
to meet the challenge. 
Officially established July 1, 1946, the presence 
of the United States Sixth Fleet is, today, an accepted 
fact of diplomatic life. The Fleet exists as both symbol 
and substance of American military presence in the Mediter-
ranean basin. Simply stated, its mission is to act _in 
support of United States foreign policy and interests in the 
Mediterranean area; collaterally, the U. S. Sixth Fleet 
stands prepared to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
ization as a NATO Strike Force. 4 Compris !ed of between forty 
and fifty ships, the Sixth Fleet projects a potent political 
and psychological image. The carrier battlegroup (approx-
imately fo.urteen ships in support of an aircraft carrier) 
is regarded as the striking edge of this force. Addition-
ally, part of the Sixth Fleet which is not readily seen 
but nevertheless acknowledged as present is a substantial 
nuclear submarine force. The fact that these forces can 
Turkish Straits is a simple military matter. (See Appendix 
A for a map of the area.) 
4 . 
In 1952, Greece and Turkey were accepted as full 
members in NATO. This inclusion broadened the mission i of 
t he Sixth Fleet due to its subsequent assignment as NATO 
Strike Force. The existence of force-in-being gave NATO 
4 
can deliver · either conventional or nuclear weapons on any 
target within a thousand - miles circumference of the Fleet's 
position cannot be easily ignored. 
Since its inception, tpe Sixth Fleet has been in-
volved in five major conflicts--the Suez Crisis of 1956, 
the Lebanese Civil War of 1958, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, 
the 1970 Jordanian Crisis, and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. 
Under the broad mission of protecting American interests, 
the Sixth Fleet evacuated Americans from Israel and Egypt 
in 1967, landed Marines in Lebanon in 1958_, provided a 
dramatic show of force during the Jordanian crisis, and 
completed the communications and logistics link between 
the United States and Israel during both the 1967 and 1973 
wars. Although fleet components were utilized directly in 
several ~onflicts, in each instance, their most important 
application waq diplomatic--a clear signal to America's 
allies that U. S. support was dependable and to the Soviet 
Union that the United States considered its interests in 
a specific crisis to be sufficient enough to commit the 
Sixth Fleet. 
American · interest in the Mediterranean today is 
obvious. America requires .Middle East oil, and the Medi-
terranean is the vi t al link to that oil. However, of 
greater importance in the Mediterranean than the access to 
its deterrent value. 
5 
oil is th e need to preserve and enhance the credibility of 
American power and to ensure that the t •raditional foreign 
policy concerns of the United States be safeguarded. Since 
189 9 , when John Hay first publically enunciated the "Open 
Door," American foreign policy has consistently been . guided 
by a dynamic expansionism. Although the "Open Door Notes" 
had been initially directed at Great Power involvement 
in China, by 194'5 .the United States had extended its scope 
to include the entire world. 5 In the Mediterranean Sea, 
the "door" needed to remain open to ensure quick, secure 
access to the Middle Eastern petroleum reserves. The 
United States viewed Soviet ambitions as inimical to the 
maintenance of free and easy access to these resources. 
The commitment of American naval forces to the Mediterranean 
in the post-World War Two era clearly represented this 
g lobal application of the Open Door policy. Although the 
United States had been active in the Mediterranean Sea for 
over a century, the introduction of American vessels on such 
a large scale mirrored new strategic concerns and unexpected 
diplomatic pressures. 
5The post-World War One pattern of open-door expan-
sion into the oil rich Middle East was a precursor of the 
· mi litar y involvement which was to follow the Second World 
War. For an excelle nt discussion of the uses of the Open 
Doo r in the Mediterranean area, see William A. Williams, 
The Tragedy of American Di p lomac y (New York: Dell Publishing 
Co. , 1972 ed.) Chapter 4, Part II. 
CHAPTER I 
American Nava l Presence in the 
Mediterranean Prior to 1946 
As early as 1801, a young United States dispatched 
its first naval contingent to the Mediterranean . This 
battle squadron, comprised of the schooner Enterprise and 
the frigates Philadelphia, Essex, and President entered 
Gibraltar harbor on July 5, 1801. 6 The missi on of this 
group was multi - purpose: to project American presence into 
an area which was tightly controlled by the British, to 
secure pledges of peace and cooperation from various North 
African states, to assist American dipl omatic personnel, 
and to protect the rapidly increasing American commercial 
interests in the area . By 1803, the U. S. Naval forces in 
the Mediterranean had more than doubled in size. Clearly 
this fledgling Republic perceived that its prestige and 
honor, in addition to the viabili t'y of i.ts nascent commer-
cial ventures, necessi t ated this naval presence, despite 
the tremendous monetary costs and the critical over-exten-
sion 9f meager American maritime assets. 
The Navy proved itself to be increasingly effective 
6 Jesse W. Lewis, Jr ., The Strategic Balance in the 
Mediterranean, p. 12 
6 
7 
in protecting American trade in the Mediterranean. 7 Accord-
ingly, Jefferson permitted the Medi terranean squadron to 
remain on station until 1807. By 1807 however, economic 
difficulties within the United States necessitated closure 
of the shore support base at Syracuse, Sicily and the dis-
establishment of the Mediterranean squadron. American 
naval vessels, nevertheless, continued to cruise the Medi-
terranean; however, they sailed as single units and depended 
up on British shore establishments for logistical support. 
American reliance on British shore facilities came 
to an abrupt end with the outbreak of the War of 1812. 
Great Britain barred American commerce from the Mftditer -
ranean, and the small, over-extended Ameri can Navy was in 
no position to challenge the world's greatest maritime 
power. Congress, however, supplemented the United States 
Navy with hundreds of newly commissioned privateers. Their 
mi ssion--to steam independently and prey upon British ship-
ping whenever and wherever possible--was eminently success-
fu1 . 8 Although the British Navy retained supremacy in the 
Mediterranean before and after the War of 1812, the courage, 
7Leonard F . Guttridge and Jay D. Smith, The Commodores 
(New York : Harper & Row, 1969) pp. 24-36 
8The Essex and the privateers who accompanied her 
virtually wiped British whaling interests from the Pacific 
Ocean; thus, making the phenomenal growth of the New England 
whalin g industry both easy and profitable . See Irving 
Werstein's The Cruise of the Essex (Philadelphia: MacRae 
Smith, 1969 
8 
seamanship, and skill of their American counterparts earned 
these American sailors grudging respect and admiration from 
their British adversaries. The first links of future Anglo-
American naval partnership were forged during these early 
decades of the nineteenth century. 
The Treaty of Ghent, ending the War of 1812, had 
, 
hardly been signed when the U. S. Congress officially de-
clared war on Algiers. American naval actions during this 
period have been immortalized in the national mythology. 
Stephen Decatur's exploits, the "shores of Tripoli; •." and 
the eventual defeat of Algiers all fuelled a sense of spir-
ited nationalism within the United States. However, little 
• 
mention is made of the fact that the power of the Dey of 
Algiers actually was broken by a joint Anglo-American-Dutch 
effort and not by the daring activities of Decatur and the 
United States Marines. 
Following the successful conclusion of the Barbary 
War, the Navy resumed business as usual. Still forced to 
depend upon the British for logistics and repairs, the 
United States Navy also found itself protecting a burgeon-
ing national commerce and a greatly expanded fishing and 
whaling industry. A single casual cruiser would no longer 
suffice. Therefore, the U. S. Navy established permanent 
cruising stations in most of the world's waters. 9 United 
9The United States Navy had small squadrons cruising 
most of the world 's waters. In a day when the Indian Ocean 
9 
States warships assigned to the Medit erranean made the circuit 
of the Sea's choicest ports--Syracuse, Valletta, Marseille, 
Malaga, and Mynorca. Generally, the Mediterranean was con-
sidered the early Navy 's most pleasant assignment--beauti-
ful women, delightful climate, magnificent scenery, and 
just enough excitment to make life interesting.lo Over the 
next three-quarters of a century, American naval vessels in 
the Mediterranean would steam from port to port acting as 
visible representatives of the United States in a sea still 
controlled by British power. 
The pertod from 1865 to 1890 was a time of consid-
erable American naval stagnation. The easy cooperation with 
and dependence upon British naval power in the Mediterranean 
and in the Far East permitted the American Navy to act as 
passive representatives in those areas . The American Navy 
was essentially a third-rate power. Particularly interest-
ing during this period was the antagonistic rhetoric within 
the United States (especially in Congress) towards Great 
Britain) yet despite these anti-Anglo sentiments, the Am-
erican Navy 's reliance upon British infrastructure in the 
Mediterranean actually increased. 
occupies such a prominent position in the minds of naval 
strategist (and is present in the press to the American 
people as a "new" concern of the U. s.), it is hard to be-
lieve that the U. S. Navy possessed an Indian Ocean squadron 
as early as the third decade of the nineteenth century. 
10Leonard Guttridge and Jay Smith, The Commodores, pp. 
53-66 
10 
Maintenance of the European squadron in the Medi-
terranean was openly attacked by the Congressional commit-
tees of this period. To some congressmen, supporting a 
large, standing navy for protection of commerce seemed an 
expensive luxury; this burden of maintaining ships in the 
Mediterranean (where American shipping was rarely if ever 
harrassed) seemed absolutely unJustified. While some con-
gressional leaders continued to argue against the forward 
deployment of naval forces in the Mediterranean, the Navy 
11 
quietly but staunchly continued to endorse it. By 1880, 
the Mediterranean assignmen~ had gained the reputation as 
easy, comfortable duty; attendance at frequent balls, parties 
and other social affairs appeared to be the raison d'etre 
for the Mediterranean Squadron. Even the pro-service Army 
and Navy Journal admitted in 1~80 that the European squadron 
was "as large as, or perhaps larger than, any real necessity 
demands. 1112 
Thus, by the late 1880 1 s the continued maintenance 
of a squadron in the Mediterranean was due largely to the 
inertia of tradition. No pressing milit~ry need demanded 
a strong American Navy in Mediterranean waters; and Congress 
was complacent, allowin g in many cases, a single, over-aged 
vessel to represent American interests. Congressional 
11 
Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
11 
disinterest in a Mediterranean naval presence was visible 
in the deteriorating conditions of the ships as s igned to 
the area--speeds of over four and one - half knots were 
prohibited lest the ship disintegrate. 13 European officers 
considered the American ships floating maritime museums, 
fit only to occupy a berth . 
The dynamic expansion of the United States dur i ng 
the 1890 1 s necessitated the development of a v i gorous, 
modern navy. Accordingly, in 1888, a major program of 
naval construction was undertaken to convert the rot - ridden, 
sail - driven American Navy to a fast, modern, steam - driven 
maritime force. By late 1890, the first Ameri can steam 
squadron appeared in European waters . 14 Although an exten -
sive and highly successful deployment, these maneuvers 
were not repeated for another thirteen years, another clear 
example of the lack of American interest in the Mediterranean 
Sea . Between 1890 and 1903, any U. S. warship~~hich did 
visit Mediterranean ports were usually alone and . invariably 
15 
on their way to or from the Far East . 
Naval endeavors after 1898 were characterized by 
13william J. Hourihan, "Best Ambassador : Rear Ad-
miral Cotton and the Cruise of the European Squadron, 1903," 
Nava l War College Review (June - July 1979) : 63 
14 Ibid., p . 64 
15 Ibid., p. 65 
12 
set and drift, reaction and counterreaction. The Navy 
Department's Bureau of Navigation possessed no coherent 
fleet policy. The Navy's first class warships were dis-
persed haphazardly around the globe, effectively dissipa-
ting any concerted United States naval presence. The ap-
pearance of a squadron centered around a capital ship-of-
the-line i~ certainly more effective than the presence of 
· a single casual cruiser. 
The presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, an ardent 
disciple of Alfred Thayer Mahan, brought clarity and direc-
tion to American naval strategy. Roosevelt and Mahan both 
viewed the Navy as an effective instrument of foreign policy--
flexible, mobile, and responsive. An astute politician, 
Roosevelt realized that single units cruising alone did 
not project the power necessary to be coercive ·. 16 The "gun-
boat diplomacy" of the era was born out of the realization 
that it i~ the perception of force-in-being which is dip-
lomatically important not necessarily the scope of the area 
patrolled. 
In April 1904, the Sultanate of Turkey refused to 
negotiate with State Department officials regarding satis-
factory protection of an Americ an missionary s~ hool in 
Turkey. The combined force s of the United States Navy 
16 Roosevelt clearly illustrated his perceptions of 
the uses of naval power when he dispatched the Great White 
Fleet on its around-the-world cruise in 1907. 
13 
present in the Mediterranean at that time were dispatched 
to Piraeus, port of Athens (located within one day's steam-
ing time of the Dardanelles), to impress the Sultan with the 
presence of American power. Throughout the course of the 
delicate and involved diplomatic negotiations regarding the 
protection of American missionaries in Turkey, the pivotal 
element of suasion underlying the eventual solution was the 
presence, "in force," of the U. S. Navy in waters adjacent 
to the Turkish littorai. 17 However, with this one exception, 
the cruises of greatest diplomatic importance in Europe 
centered upon English, German, and French ports which 
bordered, not the Mediterranean, but the Atlantic. 18 
In August 1914, the outbreak of the First World War 
altered the nature of American naval presence in the Mediter-
ranean waters. The United States, non-belligerent, pulled 
American warships out of the dangerous areas to prevent 
possible tncidents. Only after April 1917, when the United 
States entered the war, did the U. S. Navy reappear in the 
Mediterranean, and then, only in support of land actions. 
During this period between the world wars, naval 
forces in the Mediterranean remained on the periphery of 
17william J . Hourihan, "Marl inspike Diplomacy: The 
Navy in the Mediterranean, 1904," United States Naval Inst-
titute Proceedings (Januar y 1979): 3 
18 Idem, 11Best Ambassador: Rear Admiral Cotton and the 
Cruise of the European Squadron, 1903," p. 68 
14 
American national interests. Specific actions taken by 
naval commanders such as Rear Admiral Mqrk Bristol and Rear 
Admiral H. Kent Hewitt in support of American interests in 
the Eastern Medit erranean were competent, astute, and pro-
ductive.19 However, the United States government perceived 
that America's real naval interests lay elsewhere, specifi-
cally in the Far East and the Caribbean. It was primarily 
to these areas that the energy and attention of the United 
States Navy were directed . 
Throughout the Second World War, naval strategists 
persisted in viewing the Mediterranean as secondary to the 
more important mission of defeating the Japanese. In the 
European theater, the United States was reluctant to beco me 
involved deeply in the Medit erranean, viewing an assault 
on Germany from the North as more urgent. After much pres-
sure from Churchill, who desperately wanted assistance in 
protecting British interests in the Sea (particularly the 
approaches to the Suez Canal), the United States Navy en-
tered the Mediterranean. Generally, however these units 
were limited to support of amphibious landings. American 
leaders considered this incursion into the Mediterranean as 
one of many approaches for the campaign against Germany. 
19 · Dr. Henry P. Beers, "u. S. Naval Detachment in 
Turkish Waters, 1919-1924", Administrative Reference Service 
Rep ort No. 2 (Washington: Office of Naval Records Administra-
tion, Administrative Office, Naval Department, June 1943). 
15 
The United States was content to leave control of the Medi-
terranean sea lanes to the British to whom the protection 
of the sea link to India was an imperative national interest. 
By the end of Wo~ld War Two> the power and prestige 
of the United States was unsurpassed> especially the large 
and modern U. S . Navy. The Mediterranean Sea> once a Bri-
tish lake and the lifeline of the British Empire> was now 
ringed by war-devastated countrles -- Britain was prostrate; 
France> enfeebled; Italy> starving ; Greece> ripped by civil 
war· and. Turkey> frightened. The Soviet Union had acquired 
considerable territory in Eastern Eur ope and was making 
threatening overtures to Turkey and Greece . 
Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal perceived 
it as vital to the national interests ,of the United States 
that it assume a position of hegemony in the Mediterranean. 
Taking advantage of a unique "humanitarian" political op-
portunity~ Forrestal> with the agreement of Secretary of 
State James Byrnes> dispatched the USS Missouri in March 
1946 to return the remains of the Turkish Ambassador to 
Istanbul. This single goodwill visit was the genesis of 
the Sixth Fleet. 
The e stablishment of the United States Sixth Fleet 
was the result of a complex marriage of the efforts of an 
enigmatic and energetic Secretary of the Navy to implemen .t 
hi s global military strategy and the needs of naval leaders 
to find a viable postwar mission for a fleet which> in the 
16 
atomic age, some characterized as a "military dinosaur." 
The Navy, in 1945-1946, was threatened qy many forces--
the move to rationalize the armed forces by consolidation> 
the nullificati on of traditional strategic precepts by the 
atomic bomb, and the headlong rush toward demobilization 
and demilitarization. The Eastern Mediterranean crisis 
of 1946 and 1947 posed the possibility of salvation, and 
Navy officials hastened to seize the opportunity. 
CHAP'IER II 
The Unification Battle 
World War Two had been waged under the aegis of 
joint and unified command structures, but the American 
military establishment itself was not, at that time, in 
the hands of a consolidated defense department. Planning 
for the postwar military configuration was, therefore, 
divisive and parochial. Each service was obsessed with 
ensuring that demobilization and unification would be ac-
complished with minimum detriment and maximum benefit to 
that particular service. 20 
The manner of demobilization was an important con-
sideration for the services : however, the unification of 
the American ·military establishment was the primary object 
of postwar planning. Intense and acrimonious debates sur-
rounded the unification controversy as each service pro-
posed unification plans designed to guarantee its pre-
dominance. 
These te ~sions had their roots in the prewar years, 
20 vin cent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the 
U. S. Navy, 1943-1~46 (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 19 2), preface. Davis provides a thoroughly 
researched account of the domestic aspects of the unification 
controversy . 
17 
18 
particularly during the Billy Mitchel l Hearings on the 
formation of a separate Air Corps. Mitchell had argued 
that all naval air forces should be turned over to a sepa-
rate Air Corps . Of much greater concern to the survival 
of a modern Navy was Mitchel l's contention that all surface 
forces--especially naval forces--were obsolete. As Mit-
chell's advocates pushed for Air Corps autonomy following 
World War One, the recurring notion of unification of the 
armed forces in order to achieve governmental efficiency 
and to reduce waste and duplication surfaced with surprising 
strength. With particular acumen, supporters of Billy 
Mitchell's thesis pressed Congress for the establishment of 
a separate Air Corps with a centralized organizational 
structure to be superimposed over all three services--Army, 
Navy, Air Force. Thus, with the advent of World War Two, 
Air Force advocates were able to place themselves firmly 
on the side of those in Congress who supported unification. 
The Army Air Corps was able to garner. some important sup-
port for its unification battle which would begin in earnest 
once the war had been won. 
The internecine conflict regarding which service 
would c ontrol which t hea ter of operations repeatedly erupted 
during the war. The continued deterioration of inter-
service relations during World War Two was _particularly 
evident in the jurisdictional dispute in the Pacific theater. 
19 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, themselves a creation of war, 
drew a dividing line across the Pacific Ocean, assigning 
the Southern theater to General Douglas MacArthur and plac-
ing the Northern under the direction of Admiral Chester 
Nimitz . 21 This agree ment was accepted, albeit grudgingly, 
by the Navy, but when the Army pressed for over-all con -
trol of the invasion of the Japanese home islands, the 
Navy balked. Acrimonious debate raged within the services 
over who would lead the force . However, the development 
and employment of the atomic bomb relieved the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff from having to make the decision in favor of either 
s-ervice. 
Furtherm ore, the necessary and continous close-
working relati onship between Army Chief of Staff General 
George Marshall and Chief of Naval Operations Fleet Admiral 
Ernest King --both men shared a deep personal animosity --
made the uneasy truce between the departments virtually 
imp ossible to maintain . This clash of wills and its effect 
upon service operations was clearly illustrated in the 
bitter debate over which service--the Army or the Navy--
would have cognizance over the antisubmarine warfare op-
er ations in sea lanes within reach of land -based airplanes. 
The wrangling continued to intensify (with neither service 
doing the job adequatel y) while King, insistent that 
21
vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the 
U. s. Navy, 1943-1946, p. 49. 
20 
submarine warfare was the ,Navy's job, stood his ground un -
til Marshall capitulated. 22 
. 
The unification controversy flared publically for 
a brief period in April 1944, with the commencement of the 
Woodrum Committee hearings . These hearings focused on the 
question of reorganizing the postwar military services into 
a single department which would include a separate Air 
Force. A strong Navy rebuttal, orchestrated by Undersec-
retary of the Navy Forrestal, convinced the Woodrum Com-
mittee to delay the unification decision, 23 Consequently, 
th ·e Committee adjourned without a· decision, simply agreeing 
to put off the hearings indefinitely. 
The Navy Department, satisfied with the successes 
of the Woodrum Committee, allowed the unification question 
to sink into bureaucratic limbo. For a year, leading naval 
officers did nothing to forestall another Army off ensive 
on unification. However, by the spring of 1945, two sep-
arqte occurrences rekindled the controversy: the report 
of the Richardson Committee on Unification 24 and the 
22 Marshall did not give in to King's demand that 
the Navy 'have cognizance over all antisubmarine warfare 
until a German submarine approached to within three miles 
of the entrance of the Chesapeake Bay undetected. 
23 Forrestal appeared before the Woodrum Committee 
ins t ead of Secretary of the Navy Knox because Knox had been 
incapacitated by a heart attack. Knox died during the Com-
mit t ee Hearings and Forrestal became Acting Secretary. 
24 · Records of the Hearings before the Senate Committee 
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intensification of the Army Air Corps' public relations 
campaign which sought to glorify all its heroes, past and 
present, and attempted to make it appear as if the Air 
Force had won World War II singlehandedly . 25 
The importance of the Richardson Committee was un-
derestimated by the Navy. Fleet Admiral King, Chief of · 
Naval Operations, made several tactical errors . Although 
King appointed Admiral J. 0. Richardson, a known opponent 
of unification, no one had troubled to ascertain the views 
of Rear Admiral M. S. Schoeffel, an incon s picuous career 
naval officer, the other naval appointee. Furthermore, 
the Navy De'partment had agreed to accept an "alternate 11 
member of the committee, with the understanding that the 
"alternate" would take no part in the proceedings unless 
one of the primary members were incapacitated .for a lenghty 
period . 
T~is agreement that the "alternate" member of the 
Richardson Committee, Colonel F . Trubee Davison, would 
exercise no initiative soon evaporated . General William 
Tompkins, the senior War Department member, was hospitalized 
with pneumonia whi·le the other members of the committee, 
including Colonel Davison, to u red the Pacific. General 
on Military Affairs on S. 84 and S. 1482, 79th Congress, 
2nd Session (Washington: GPO, 1945) contained an abridg-
ment of the Richardson Committee Report to the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. 
25 Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the 
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Tompkins quickly returned to duty, but, as a result of his 
brief absence, found his duties shared by Colonel Davison. 
The net result of this maneuver was that both Davison and 
Tompkins helped to draft and sign the final document. 
The majority report of the RiGhardson Committee was 
submitted on April 11, 1945. Its wording stung the Navy 
opponents of unification: 
The Special Committee, excepting the senior naval 
member, is unanimously in favor of a single department 
system of organization of the Armed Forces of the 
United States .... The Special Committee believes that 
enabling legislation for the creation of a single de-
partment should be enacted without delay ... not later 
than six months after the end of the war. 26 
The innocuous language of the report attempted to assuage 
Navy fears that unification was tantamount to emasculation. 
However~ the intentionally vague and ambiguous assurances 
only served to intensify the Navy's convictions that the 
end result of a single department system for national de-
fense would be a weak, third-rate navy. The Richardson 
Report struck at what Forrestal and the yoiung admirals who 
had won their stars in the Pacific considered the soul of 
the modern navy--the Naval Air Forces and their carriers. 
Admiral John S. McCain summed up Navy suspicions in a 
l e tter .to Secretary Forrestal on April 28, 1945: 
No matter how fair the words, or beguiling the 
U. S. Navy, 1943-1946, p. 148 
26 Lawrence Legere, Jr., "Unification of the Armed 
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phraseology, and regardless of intent, a unified command, 
a single service or department of national defense, 
will of necessity be an instrument -for extra-consti-
tutional and an interested division of funds prior to 
submission to the disinterested Congress. The Army 
banks on controlling the individual who will head this 
sin gle unit, and historically, they will be correct in 
that assumption. 
There will be little planes as well as big planes 
that will sink all types amphibious tanks can be built 
up to that role for public consumption. This will 
appeal to the grand American delusion that wars can be 
fought cheaply. 
It is beginning to look to me that the war after 
the war will be more bitter than the actual war. 27 
A vigorous Air Force public relations offense against 
the Navy followed quickly on the heels of the Richardson 
Report. The first important salvo was a ninety-five page 
"cone lusion" appended to General H. H. ("Hap") Arnold's 
second wartime report to the Secretary of War. Arnold 
stated that 
We must first recognize that the only certain pro-
tection against aggression is the ability to meet and 
overcome it before the aggressor can strike the first 
blow. In the past such blows have been waterborne; 
traditional naval power was our first line of defense. 
From now on successful a Jgression must come from the 
air .... Our first line of defense must be the air. 28 
Arnold made it readily apparent that he did not include 
Force s " , ( Ph . D . 
p. 69 
27 Robert 
1947 (Annapolis: 
dissertation, Harvard University, 1950) 
G. Albion, Makers of Naval Policyb 1798-
Naval Institute Press, 1980), p. 07. · 
28
vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and · the 
U. S. Navy, 1943-1946, p. 152 
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naval air in his definition of "first line of defense. 11 
He stated that such air power 11must be employed from large, 
fully-equipped, strate gica lly located bases." 29 
The Navy began to react publicly to the Richardson 
Committee Report and to the public rel a tions barrage pro-
duced by the Air Force. At the launching of the "super-
carrier" USS Franklin D. Roosevelt, Secretary of the Navy 
James Forrestal asserted that the U. S. Navy deserved the 
credit for gre~tly increasing the scope and use of air-
craft by applying it to sea power. 3° Forrestal sought to 
broaden the strategic and tactical thinking of both Congre?s 
and old-line Navy thinkers in his statement before a Senate 
Subcommittee on Appropriations less than a week after the 
launching of the Roosevelt: 
One of the major purposes of the fast .carriers 
interdiction strikes in advance of an invasion is to 
knock out or pin down Japanese land-based a ir power 
around our target . The battles of our carrier-based 
air ppwer against Japanese land-based air power now 
compri ses one of the g reat struggles going on in the 
Pacific. It really points up the question: Can sea air 
power cope with landbased air power? I think that the 
answer is in the fact we are coping with it and we have 
beaten it. 31 
The use of the term "sea air power" before a Senate 
20 
...,Ibid. 
30 New York Times, April 30, 1945, p.l 
31u. S. Congress, Navy Department Appropriation 
Bill for 1946, ~enate; hearings on H.R. 2907 before the 
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 
79th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: GPO, 1945), pp. 
L~-5. 
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committee implied an emerging revitalization of the Navy's 
image and a new conceptualization of th~ strategic and 
tactical value of a modern nava l force . Forrestal articu -
lated one of the pri mary lessons learned by naval officers 
during World War Two-- modern naval warfare was infinitely 
more complex than such simplistic strategic and tactical 
concepts as navy - to - navy ratios for battle plans. For more 
than half a century before the Second World War, the Navy's 
premier strategic concept was that navies exist for fighting 
other navies . In his acclaim for nava l aviation, Forrestal 
was categorically stating that the development of naval 
aviation permitted the rapid and effective deployment of 
aircraft against land-based forces . Continually, Forrestal 
emphasized the flexibility of naval aviation: 
In my judgement, these great carrier task forces 
backed up by the surface power of the fleet and by the 
amphibious strikin g force of the Marine Corps, con-
stitute the all-purpose weapon. 32 
He continued to testify that a postwar navy of sufficient 
size and flexibility to remain away from homeports f or 
ex tended periods was mandatory . 33 
Bef ore another Senate Subcommittee (Senate Naval 
Affairs Committee, February 1946), Admiral Forrest P. 
32u. S. Con gre ss, H. of Rep., Composition of the 
Postwar Navy; hearings before the House Committee on Naval 
Affairs (available in a sin gle volume entitled Sundry Legis-
lation Affectin the Naval Establishment 1 45, Washington: 
GPO, 19 5 p. 11 
33sundry Legislation, p. 1169 
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Sher man, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, supported For-
restal's thesis by stating that the U. S. Navy required a 
fleet ca pable of operating at speeds from five to fifteen 
knots, for six thousand miles, for periods of up to 190 
days. 34 These fleet operations would have to be conducted 
in many areas without the benefit of shore infrastructure 
support. Sherman envisioned such a navy was required to 
fulfill future U. S. global mission needs . 
In the face of vigorous Army and Air Force offen-
sives, naval leaders continued to project arguments regard-
ing the practical application of sea power in support of 
foreign policy in an age distorted by the atomic bomb. New 
fleet organization plans proposed the establishment of fleet 
task groups, each consisting of four or five battlegroups. 35 
Since the battlegroups would be formed around aircraft 
ca rriers, the task force would be of sufficient size and 
flexibili½Y to permit effective diplomatic use of the fleet 
as a tool of "suasion 11• 36 This fleet organization, coupled 
with the expanding concept of 11sea air power 11--whe n added 
to t he growin g re a liz at io n that Soviet Russia was a potential 
34u. S. Congress , Senate, Hearin gs . Before the Senate 
Committee on Naval Affairs , H. R. 4421 (Washington: GPO, 1946) 
p. 1131 
35Naval Organiz at ion Manual, 1946 
36 
The t er m "su a sio n 11 was coined by Edward N. Luttwak, 
The Pol i tica l Uses of Sea Power, The Washington Center of 
Foreign Poli cy Res earch of J ohn s Hopki n s University School of 
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enemy--became the touchstones of the modern Navy. 
The chief sour ce of this new Na~y would be the ex-
erience of World War Two itself. The United States and the 
world witnessed a radical departure from the traditional 
emplo,; --:1ent f ·naval forces. The carrier sea battles which 
secured the Pacific for the United St ates emphasized the 
potency of sea-based aviation and heralded the eclipse of 
naval tactics which revolved around ship-to-ship combat. 
The men ~ho had earned their stars in these battles--young, 
vigorous naval aviators who had captained the carrier 
forces--were at the helm of this new Navy. Consequently, 
visionaries continued to see the unlimited potential of 
sea power, but in a new sense-- "sea air power." The .pro-
blem was, however, to reduce these visions to concrete 
doctrine instead of tenuous dreams. In this effort old 
strate gic concepts of Mahan were replaced by no single 
doctrinal statement--the flow of action and policies be-
came the new code. The sense of this new Navy--unclear 
to so me who had made the sea service their lives--was more 
opaque to the controllers of the defense appropriations, 
the Congress. The Navy critically needed a spokeman of 
stature and position who c ould iddress these new naval 
Advanced International Studies (Studies in International 
Affair s , No. 23), (Balti more: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press., 1974). The term "su a sio n " refers to the coercive 
and deterrent value of an effective naval display and its 
utilizati on as a tool of siplomac y . 
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concepts in a language easily understood by Congressional 
committees. If this modern Navy lacked -a Mahanesque master 
of profound statements, it did have a champion and a leader 
who symbolized the esse nce of its new soul--James V. 
Forrestal, a political man for a political time. 
CHAP'IER III 
James Forrestal: 
Architect of a Modern Navy 
The American military establishment had been seriously 
fragmented by the unification controversy. The lack of 
cooperation between the services was mirrored by a similar 
abrasive relationship between the civilian heads of service 
and their military counterparts. Traditionally., military 
policy decisions had been made and implemented by the mil-
itary chiefs of the respective services. The various Sec-
retaries represented and exercised only nominal civilian 
control over policy development and direction. Further-
more., they had little input into broader decisions of na-
tional .policy. However., the office of the Secretary of the 
Navy during the period 1944 through 1947 was occupied by 
James V. Forrestal., a man whose influence far outweighed 
the position he held within government. 
Forrestal was sworn in as Secretary of the Navy on 
May 19., 1944 following the death of Secretary Frank Knox 
(resulting from a heart attack during the Woodrum Committee 
Hearings). Knox had been an amiable Secretary of the Navy., 
allowing events to dictate his actions. Forrestal., on the 
other hand, was dynam ic and aggressive, quick to seize the 
30 
advantage. Forrestal had entered governm l nt service as one 
of Roosevelt's $10,000 a year administrat ve assistants. 
Several month s later Congress created the Office of the 
· Undersecretary of the Navy and Forrestal, a former naval 
aviator, promptly indicated that he would like to hold the 
position. On August 6, 1940, he became U dersecretary of 
the Navy .for Industrial Mobilization whic he held until 
becoming Secretary. 
While Undersecretary, Forrestal h d characteristi-
cally broadened the ,activities of his par icular office to 
include a much larger area of responsibility than actually 
. I 
prescribe -d. Even before Knox's death, Forrestal had assumed 
many of the duties and responsibilities o l Secretary of the 
Navy. By surrounding himself with highly competent and 
aggressive assistants, Forrestal involved himself in the 
• postwar planning and the daily operating • ctivities of the 
Navy Depa~tment. When he actually became Secretary, the 
gu lf which had once separated civilian fr m military within 
the naval establishment was effectively b r idged. It is 
no exaggeration to state that Forrestal, ~n taking th e 
moribund Navy Department ?Way from the st l ategic doctrine 
espoused by the old-line "battleship admi als;·~ was to have 
a greater impact - on the Navy than any . man since Alfred Thayer 
Mahan . 37 
37Robert Albion , Maker s of Naval 
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As note~ service secretaries norm lly exercised 
little influence over policy matters outs1de . the narrow 
confines of their particular province . Tl roughout his 
governmental career, however, Forrestal wks inclined to 
I interpret his duties in the broadest possible terms. It 
was only logical that once assuming the o}fice of Secretary 
of the Navy he would attempt to expand hi k duties into 
international policy matters. He was ins t rumental in the 
establishment of the State -War-Navy Coordinating Committee 
(SWNCC) in November 1944 for the purpose ! f "formulating 
re~ommendations to the Secretary of State on questions 
having both military and political aspect and of inter-
departmental interest." 38 The official re f°gn ition of this 
informal council provided Forrestal and the Navy with a 
cabinet level platform from which to infl l ence - presidential 
decisions relating ~o matters of gl~al s t rategy . 
F~rrestal feared, above all, the rate at which the 
c ountry was "going back to bed" and consi t ered such rapid 
demobilization an invit ation for Soviet efpan sion int o the 
oil-rich Persian Gulf . He conceived that ! in the power 
vacuum created by the collapse of British power, national 
security demanded the g lobal presence of merican military 
power in general and the United States Navl y in particular. 39 
38 Robert Albion, Makers of Naval )Policy, p . ·407 
39
walter Mills, The Forrestal Dia ies (New York: 
The Vikin g Press, 1951) p.97 
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Long before actual overt Soviet moves became evident, For-
restal regarded bssian postwar intention ~ with gr~ing 
apprehension. At the root of this warine s was a basic 
anti-Bolshevik, anti-Soviet attitude pred·cated upon the 
Wilsonian ideal that the liberal democrat·c capitalistic 
form of government existing within the United States should 
be the form adopted by all the world's go~ernments. Within 
this framework, Forrestal perceived any Soviet move as 
threatening the vital national interests rf the United States. 
As early as September 1942, Forre 1tal warned publicly that "never again should this country be permitted to discard 
its arms and to rely upon protocols of go bd faith and the 
general statements of good will. .,4o He wa~ convinced that 
the Russians were determined to push for a much wider sphere 
of influence than the "Open Door II would pl rmi t •. He was firmly 
persuaded that the United States needed a strong military 
to deter ~oviet expansionism and, if need d, to counter 
Soviet aggression. He adamently believed that "there would 
be no peace in the world, no final victor , until we demon-
str a ted to the Russians that whenever and wherever we say 
. 41 1 no 1 we mean business." Forrestal made [ everal initiatives 
de si gn ed to cr eate a pos t wa r global naval presence which 
would be capable of s howing the Soviets II e mean business. 11 
40 Arnold A. Rogow, Ja mes Forresta : A Stud in Per-
so na li ty , Politics, an d Policy New York: The MacMillan Co., 
1963) p. 124 
41walter Mills, The Forrestal Dia ies, p. 57 
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In mid-1945, Vice-Admiral Forrest ! Sherman, Assistant 
Chief of Naval Operations for Strategic . Planning, under the 
direction of Forrestal began work on a ne L series of war 
plans. Specifically, the plans involved k "pincher" move-
ment to attack Russia from air bases in B~itain and from 
aircraft carriers in ·:the Mediterranean. 42 1 The PINCHER plans, 
which formed the basis for Joint War Commi ttee Plan 432/7 43 
postulated that World War Three would erupt with the Soviet 
Union within three years. The planners afsumed that a war 
with the Soviets would take the pattern of the Second World 
War, in that it would be global and total, and would start 
with a Soviet offensive in the Middle Eas 1, eventually spreading to Europe. The strategists reasoned that United 
States petroleum resources would be insuf f icient for major 
war after the second year unless supplemE=tl6ted -from the 
44 Middle East. To dominate the Middle East, the plan esti-
mated tha~ the Soviets would overrun Gree r e and Turkey, 
seize control of the Eastern Mediterranean and strike at 
I 
the Middle East. PINCHER placed the principal theater of 
42oennis M. Pricolo, "Naval Pres J ce and Cold War 
Foreign Policy: A Stud y of the Decision t ra Station the 6th 
Fleet in the Mediterranean, 1945-1958 11, Trident Report No. 
95 (Anna polis: U. S. Nava l Academy, 1978), p. 46 
43 Memorandum for the Chief of Na~al Operations, 7 
June 1946, Conference with OP-3O on War Planning, Al6-3(5) 
War Plans 1946, Operational Archives Branch, Naval History 
Divisio n . 
44 RADM Cato D. Glover, Memorandu for the Chief of 
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concentration and operations in the Easte l n Mediterranean. 
One of the major offensive moves contemplated by the initia-
tors of plan PINCHER was that the America h Navy had to be 
I 4s prepared 11to seize the Aegean Sea and the l Turkish Straits." 
PINCHER clearly demonstrated the ~mportance of the 
Mediterranean in a future war and the cri l ical nature of 
that sea ·for the American Navy. It was the only area 11where 
Allied naval and air superiority could be l brought to bear 
against the Soviet Union without being ex1osed to the full force of the Red Army." 46 With the recognition of the po-
t.ential for conflict with the Soviet Uni ) , the Mediterranean 
assumed new and unexpected prominence for American naval 
strategists. In areas contiguous to the Sea, the fact that 
defense of the Mediterranean littoral would be "ex tremely 
I difficult and costly 11 without the preposi f ioning of American 
nava l assets provided substantial and convenient justifica-
tion for ~orrestal's global ambitions. These ambitions 
I 
required the establishment of a standing Naval force in 
the Mediterranean. 
The relationship of military power to foreign policy 
continued to preoccupy Forrestal . "It is my strongest per -
sonal belief that our diplomatic and mili r ary policies 
Naval Operations, "Resu me of PINCHER Planning," 21 January 
1947, Serial OOO5p3O, Al6-3 War Plans 1947, OP- 3O Files, 
Operational Archives, Naval History Division. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Denn is M. Pricolo, Trident Stud No. 95, p. 72 
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must be closely matched, 11 wrote Forre s tal in hi s diary dated 
July 1946. 47 As always, he followed phi _losophy with act ion. 
In his capacity as Secretary of the Navy, he ordered the 
inclusion of a course entitled 11The Foundations of National 
Power" in the curriculum of middle-echelon officers at the 
Naval War College. By autumn 1946, this course was published 
and made available to all naval personnel via the Naval 
Correspondence Course Centers. 48 The i mportance of training 
military men in matters of policy was stressed repeatedly 
in his diary and other papers: 
I have one more point to offer: the need for wise, 
trained men to administer the National Policy. We need 
men who understand the ca~ses of war and conflict, who 
understand the interrelation of international policies, 
trade and finance, and the true significance of military 
power .... We must find and train such men--outstanding 
civilians who have served their country under arms and 
outstanding military men who have studied to understand 
the civilian aspects of government and "international 
relations . If we do n 't find and train and eruploy such 
men in the service of the United States, we will lose 
our shirts ... and then what avails the sacrifice of life, 
blood> and treasure that we have made? 49 
Forrestal approached his grow in g apprehension of the 
Soviets with typical systematic and scholarly precision. On 
47walter Mills, The Forrestal Diaries, p. 72 
48
rbid., p. 57. That this course was extended to 
enlisted men as well as officers is a good example of the 
ability of Forrestal to accomplish what he desired. In 
what was the least egalitarian of the services, a course of-
ferred t o both officer and enlisted was rare. 
49 Ibid . , p. 62 
May 26, 1945, he requested Dr. E. F. Willett, an aide, to 
prepare a research paper assessing the 9 ggressive potential 
of Stalin and the Soviet Union. The result was a forty - five 
page memorandum, dated January 14, 1946, that concluded: 
It has been clearly established that, to the extent 
that Russian objectives are governed by the principles 
of Dialectical Materialism and Communist philosophy, 
that they are directly opposed to the United States and 
that they are so directly opposed as to make warfare be~ 
tween the two nations seem inevitable .... The nature of 
the paths by which war can be avoided point conclusively 
to the necessity of our maintaining this nation in a 
position of such impregnable strength that possible 
enemies would regard attack on her as suicidal. 50 
Another clear indicati .on of the seriousness with which 
Forrestal regarded the Soviet threat was the fact that upon 
receiving a copy of the "long telegram" written by George 
Kennan concerning the Soviet Union's future in~entions, 
he immediately had copies made and distributed to all mem-
bers of the Navy Department . Furthermore, he insisted in 
a memorandum that all Navy officials be thoroughly conversant 
with the information contained in Kennan's telegram. 51 
Forre stal was obsessed with the noti on that a s trong 
postwar navy guaranteed American global hegemony and pro-
tected the peace won by World War Two. In his eyes to be 
less than the strongest nat ion on earth inv ited another 
50vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the 
U. S. Navy, 1943 - 1946, p. 222 
51 Robert Albion, Makers of Naval Policy , pp . 6ll-
613 
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Munich and by implication, World War Three. However, he 
faced powerful opposition to his attempts to maintain such 
a maritime force. Although the preeminence of American 
power was a shared Administration view, most within the 
Truman White House saw the strength of United States mili-
tary presence in an Air Force second to none. Furthermore, 
the Army had the ear of the President (Truman had been an 
artillery officer during World War One and held a charac~ 
teristic disdain for the Navy). The fledgling Air Force, 
flushed with the power inherent in the ability to deliver 
the bomb, had acquired important Congressional support in 
its campaign to receive the lion's share of the postwar 
defense appropriations. The Air Force attack was parti-
cularly acidic. Brigadier General Frank Armstrong, an 
aviator, expressed the Air Force view quite succinctly: 
You gentlemen had better understand that the Army 
Air Force is tired of being the subordinate outfit, and 
is no longer going to be a subordinate outfit". It was 
the piedominant force during the war. It is going to 
be the predominant force during the peace, and you 
might as well make up your minds whether you like it or 
not that we do not care whether you like it or not: 
the Army Air Force is going to run the show. You, the 
Navy are not going to have anything but a couple of 
carriers which are ineffective anyway and they will be 
probably sunk in the first battle. 
Now, as for the Marines, you know what Marines are. 
They are a small, fouled-up army talking Navy lingo. 
We are going to put the Marines in the regular Army 
and make efficient soldiers out of them. The Navy is 
going to end up only supplying the requirements of the 
Army and Air Force. 52 
52 U. S. Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee 
Faced with such vitrolic attacks, Forrestal person-
ally went on the offensive. Cautioning naval officers not 
to speak against unification (President Truman had already 
signalled approval of the idea), Forrestal insisted they 
concentrate on the task of building a viable image for the 
Navy in th~ atomic world. Forrestal vigorously refuted 
the idea that the Navy had been made obsolete by the atomic 
bomb; he stressed that the Navy was moving forward in re-
search and development of carrier-borne atomic weapons. 
Forrestal and his Navy argued that the atomic bomb, however 
powerful, was 11still a bomb, requiring land- and carrier-
based planes to deliver it. 1153 Prestigious wartime heroes 
such as Admirals Chester Nimitz and William 11Bull 11 Halsey 
publicly discounted the threats that the atomic bomb alleg-
edly posed for the continued existence of the Navy.5 4 
Speaking at a luncheon in Philadelphia, Admiral Nimitz 
stated: 
There a~e some people who claim that the atomic 
bomb now makes navies obsolete. That has been claimed 
for every other new weapon, from the smooth-bore gun 
to the armor-piercing shell. The submarine and the air-
plane forced changes in navies and the atomic bomb will 
Hearings on Unification, 1947 (Washington: GPO, 1947)pp. 177, 
641 
53 U. S. Congress, H. of Rep., Composition of the 
Postwar Navy (Washington: GPO, 1945) pp. 1164-1165 
54New York Ti m~s, February 22, 1946, p. 3 
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f orce changes in design and operations of ships. 
But while the prophets of naval.doom are shouting 
themselves hoarse, the Navy will be at work to make the 
changes needed to accomodate American sea power to the 
new weapon .... The American genius for the exercise of 
sea power will not be allowed to languish.55 
Forrestal beca me an -ex-~raordinarily effective naval 
advocate before Congressional committees . A more powerful 
speaker than former Secretary Knox, Forrestal always entered 
a Congressional hearing prepared to go on the offensive. 
Before a House Naval Affairs Committee, he outlined two 
fundamental reasons why Congress should not cut the Navy's 
appropriations: 
First, the outstanding lesson of the past quarter cen-
tury is that the means to wage war must be in the hands 
of those who hate war. The United States must always 
remain strong. Second, the Navy is a major component 
of that strength. In each of the past two wars, our 
enemies have failed to control the seas-- and they were 
defeated .... Attacks upon us or by us must ~ross over, 
on, and under the sea .... The key to victory and to 
freedom will be the control of the seas and the skies 
above them. 56 
Forrestal's appreciation of the "influence of sea 
power" appeared frequently in his letters,- speeches, and 
diaries. In preparation for a book he never wrote, he de-
lineated his impressions of sea power: 
Sea power--what it means. Seventy-one percent of 
the earth's surf ace is water ... Sea power has still the 
same meaning it had when the Romans had to get a fleet 
55New York Times, February, 1946, p. 6 
56Robert G. Albion and Robert H. Connery, Forrestal 
and the Navy (New York: Columbia Univers~ty Press, 1962),p. 185 
40 
to conquer the Mediterranean. The same as when Britain 
. , 
one by one, cut off the tentacles of Napoleon's octopus. 
The same as in 1917, when Anglo -American control of the 
Atlantic spelled defeat for Germany .... The Army's failure 
to understand and appreciate sea power--their fundamental 
attitude that this is a simple matter of transportation. 
Three dimensions of power; the surface of the seas, the 
air above it, and the subsurface. 57 
Forrestal's concept of sea power as an integral 
part of American global strategy was never better illustrated 
than in his advocacy of the reestablishment of Ame.rican navaJ.. 
forces in the Mediterranean. The basis of his vision of the 
. 58 Navy's mission was the "mystique of visit diplomacy." 
However, port vis tt s of major warships to countries where 
political instability was in question (always characterized 
as "courtesy calls") implied U. S. power-in-being, demon-
strated United States concern in that country an~ threatened 
the use of force in support of American national interests 
if necessary . A show of naval strength could provide "a 
tangible means for the support of policy which air power 
cannot duplicate. 1159 Forrestal realized early that a strong 
naval presence in the Mediterranean could reach all disputed 
points (without the necessity of fixed bases), could demon-
57rbid. The three dimensions of power described by 
Forrestal accurately expose his plan for the development of 
a postwar Navy --th e fast attack airplane carrier, the so-
phisticated carrier-based aviation arm, and the submarine 
program . Rickover I s nuclear ."carte blanche II arose out of this 
need to redefine the Navy's mission in an atomic world . 
58Admiral Holloway, former CNO, challenged the effi-
cacy of "visit diplomacy" in the May 1979 U. S. Naval Insti-
tute Proceedings. 
59Albion and Connery, Forrestal and the Navy, p. 186 
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strate the power of American striking force, and might 
possibly encourage the pro - American a li gnment of other 
60 
nations . 
Forrestal 's mistru st of the Soviet Union grew al-
most daily throughout 1945 and 1946. I n a speech given 
April 29, 1946 to the Foreign Policy Association, Forrestal 
cautioned that Russia was intent upon world conquest: 
Russia can be called an enigma but there is no 
enigma if you plot the long trend of her policy since 
1921; the use of military power, threats, political 
infilitration and exploitation of other countries. 
She is always pushing, receding where rebuffed but like 
a great tide seepi ng in elsewhere if there is an 
opening. 61 
As the ge opolitical situation in the Eastern Mediterranean 
grew more critical Forrestal perceived that his fears of 
Russian intent were accurate- -t he PINCHER plan predicting 
war with the Soviet Union within three years was playing 
out . In an attempt to begin prepositioning naval units 
in the Meqiterranean, he requested Secretary of State 
Byrnes to consider the feasibility of the Navy preparing 
plans for a task force in the Mediterranean . 62 In a memo-
randum of a SWNCC meeting during which he made his request, 
Forrestal reported that Byrnes . concurred with his idea and 
60 Ibid. 
61 
Forrestal Papers (on deposit in the Mudd Library, 
Princeton Universi ·ty, Princeton, New Jersey), unpublished 
Diaries, Vol. 6, p. 1033 
62 Forrestal Papers, unpubli shed Diaries, Vol 1, 
p . 763 
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further suggested that such a task force accompany the USS 
Missouri which was scheduled to take the remains of Mehmir 
Ertugun, the late Turkish Ambassador to the United States, 
home to Istanbul. 
CHAPTER IV 
The Turkish Crisis of 1946: 
The Soviet Union and the Turkish Straits 
The geopolitical situation which led to the estab-
lishment of the U. S. Sixth Fleet lay in the traditional 
struggle of the Soviet Union to acquire control of the 
Turkish Straits and in the equally traditional efforts of 
the United States to maintain an "Open Door" worldwide. 
Prior to the opening of the Yalta Conference on February 
2, 1945, State Department officials anticipated that Stalin 
would raise the issue of control of the Sttaits and the 
. 6 
renegotiation of the Montreux Convention of 1936. 3 Soviet 
jurists had been preparing a case for the special position 
of the Black Sea states for several years. B. A. Dravov, 
a prominent Soviet writer, asserted that the Black Sea had 
a special status as a mare clausum, a "closed sea." 64 
63
stalin had expressed interest in the renegotiation 
of the Montreux Convention at both Cairo and Teheran. Roose-
velt off-handedly said that he thought that it should be 
changed as it was formulated under the auspices of the League 
of Na tion which was no longer in existence. However, in a 
private meeting between Churchill and Stalin in October 1944, 
Churchill informally agreed to the privileged position of 
the Soviet Union and other Black Sea states vis-a-vis the 
Turkish Straits. 
64william Butler, The Soviet Union and the Law of 
the Sea (Ba ltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,1971) 
p. 117 
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The Soviet interpretation of a mare clausum was 
also represented in a note to the Turkish Government on 
September 24, 1946: 
The Soviet Government desires before all to invite 
the attention of the Turkish Government to the special 
situation of the Black Sea as a closed Sea. Such a 
situation means that the Straits of the Black Sea re-
present a seaway leading only to the shores of a limited 
number of powers, namely the •shores of the Sea powers. 
Therefore, it is entirely natural ·that the Soviet Union 
and the other Black Sea powers are most interested in 
the regulation of the regime of the Straits of the Black 
Sea and accordingly their situation in this matter 
cannot be compared with other powers. 65 
The State Department, unsure o f exactly what Ameri -
can policy should be, requested that the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff undertake an analysis of Soviet demands . The study 
group formed by the Joint Chiefs submitted two separate 
opinions. A majority opinion (by Lieutenant General Stanley 
Embrick and Major General Muir Fairchild) stated that the 
control of the Straits was an historical aspiration of 
Russia mo½ivated by eco0omic need . Embrick and Fairchild 
equated Soviet designs on the Straits to the fact America 
was seeking postwar bases in Iceland, in the Azores, and 
thoughout the Pacific. Another member of the study group, 
Vice-Admiral·Russell Willson, wrote the minority opinion. 
Willson advocated strong countermoves to Soviet pressures 
on Turkey and insisted that conceding the Straits would be 
a new form of appeasement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after 
6 5Fletcher Crowe III, "The Soviet Union and the 
Tur k ish Straits, 1933-1945" (Ph. D. Dissertation: Florida 
State University, 1973), p. 197 
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reviewing both opinions, forwarded Willson's paper to the 
66 State Department. 
The United States had conceived a carefully con-
structed response to the Soviet pressures concerning the 
revision of the Montreux Convention. A memorandum, dated 
January 5, 1945 and originated by the Navy Department, 
served as a basis for American policy on the status of 
the Straits: 
This Government might not object to minor changes in 
the Convention, which might at some future date be 
suggested by the U. S.S.R (the Great Power primarily 
at interest), or by Great Britain, particularly with 
respect to the transit and navigation of warships in 
the Straits and their right of s ojourn in the Black 
Sea. Suggested changes of this sort · should, of course, 
be ca refully considered by the Navy and War Departments . 
"Internationalization" of the Straits is not a practical 
solution at this time because, if that is done, the Suez 
Canal and the Panama Canal logically should receive the 
same treatment. Turkey, remembering the capitulations 
and the "internationalization" which preceded the Mon-
treux Convention (in itself a practical form of inter-
nationalization) would strongly resist such a proposal.67 
Stalin continued to press for revision of the Straits 
protocol. He stated that Russian interests must be taken 
into account in any revision of the Montreux Convention be-
cause "it was impossible to accept any longer a situation 
66Dennis M. Pricolo, Trident Study No. 95, p. 73 
67Fletcher Crowe III, "The So.viet Union and the 
Tur kish Straits, 1933-1945", p. 282. Truman later proposed 
the fre e and unrestricted navigation of all international 
wa t e rway s a t the Potsd am Conf erence. It is interesting to 
note that the wording of this proposal in no way jeopardized 
American control of the Panama Canal. 
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in which Turkey had a hand on Russia's throat. 1168 Forrestal 
perceived this pressure as indicative of more sinister 
Soviet aims than simple access to the Straits . An entry 
in his diary dated June 24, 1945 read: 
The Russians last week renewed their pressure on 
Turkey for revision of the agreements of Montreux ... 
with an indication that they would like to detach 
Turkey from the orbit of British influence. 69 
American suspicions of the Soviet Union ' s intentions 
regarding Turkey and Greece increased markedly after Assis -
tant Secretary of State Mark F . Ethridge returned from a 
tour of the Balkans in late autumn 1945. His assessment 
of the situation was bleak: Britain could no longer be 
expected to act as a deterrent to Soviet expansion; Russia 
specifically intended to dominate Greece and Turkey in 
order to obtain control of warm water ports. This report 
served to reinforce Truman's inherently belligerent, anti-
Soviet attitude which was rooted in the Wilsonian liberal 
capitalistic world view. Top secret reports from Central 
Europe and the Middle East also increased the Truman Admini-
stration's Russo-phobia. These reports indicated to the U.S. 
that the Soviets were attempting to establish hegemony alo ~g 
its perimeter and in areas which had been traditional focal 
68 Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War 
in the Near East (Pri nceton : Princeton University Press, 
1980), p. 271 
69walter Mills, The Forrestal Diaries, p. 63 
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points of Russian interests.70 The American Ambassador to 
Turkey reported that the Turks felt that they remained 
11one of the vital points in Soviet policy. n7l Ambassador 
Wilson reported that the Turkish Secretary General of the 
Foreign Office stated that to Turkey 11the future looked 
dark but 'we would rather die on Turkish soil than be de-
ported to Siberia. 1 1172 
The Montreux Convention was never easy to interpret, 
and the Turks, perennial diplomatic tightrope walkers, were 
always sensitive about any revision of the Straits agree-
ment. Under the terms of the Montreux Convention, in case 
of war in which Turkey was a neutral, merchant ships (or-
dinarily armed during World War Two and so complicating 
matters of definition) were allowed free passage through 
the Straits, subject to minor charges and an inspection 
by Turkish health officials. Under these provisions, the 
Turks had permitted the passage of Axis ships into the 
Black Sea during the war, a fact which infuriated the 
Russians. Warships 9f belligerent powers were prohibited 
from using the Straits unless they were acting under the 
covenant of theLeague of NatioRs. The definitions utilized 
7°walter Mills, The Forrestal Diaries, p. 83 
71u. S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, VII, pp. 822-
823 
72 6 Department ofi State Incoming Telegram (S) of 
October 1946, Forrestal Papers, Vol. 4, p. 535 
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by the Montreux Convention were functionally related to 
those employed in the naval limitations . treaties and re-
lated very little to the exigencies of modern warfare . 
Warships, for example, were very narrowly defined, while 
vessels of less than one hundred tons displacement were 
excluded from definition . As a consequence, the terms of 
the Montreux Convention did not deal with the new types 
of vessels which , although under one hundred tons, were 
definitely warlike in mission. 
The real issue over the Straits was not the revision 
of the Montreux Convention. The terms of the Convention 
had generally worked to Russian advantage, particularly 
that article which prohibited the passage of belligerents 
during wartime. The Russian Navy and Merchant Marine were, 
at that time, small and of little consequence; - furthermore, 
Soviet Naval units had been most active only in the Northern 
ports and ~he Vladivostok areas. Interest in controlling 
the Straits, however, had been a traditional concern (dating 
to the time of the Czars), but this concern for unlimited 
egress from the Black Sea had been deferred by Soviet 
leaders until the opportunity presented itself at the end 
of World War Two.73 Certain historians viewed the Straits 
crisis as having evolved from a myriad of diverse issues: 
73stephen Xydis, "The American Naval Visits to 
Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in 1946: Their Impact 
on Soviet-American Relations 11 (Ph . D. Dissertation, Columbia 
University, 1956) p . 57 
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historic Russian-Turkish antipathy which had intensified 
during the Second World War; Soviet determination to gain 
control of the strategic Dardanelles; and Stalin's inherited 
Georgian trait of hating everything Turkish except the 
tobacco. 74 In a letter to a friend Admiral Leahy noted 
that the real crux of the problem of the Straits was never 
directly addressed: "everyone knew that the Russians desired 
control of this waterway. 1175 
Some officials within the United States Government 
felt that the Soviets desired more than a settlement of the 
Montreux questi on . William Bullitt, former U. S. Ambassador 
to the Soviet Union, remarked in March 1946 that: · 
The notion that the Russians have to have the Dardanelles 
for reasons of commercial egress through warm waters had 
no substance . . . there could only be one objective in the 
effort to establish Russian influence on the Mediterranean 
littoral and that was to be able to sit athwart com-
munications of the British Empire . 76 
The U. S. Ambassador to .Turkey Edwin C. Wilson cabled the 
State Department on April 12, 1946 his assessment of the 
Russian pressures for revision of the Montreux Convention: 
The development of air power during the past war 
74 Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War, 
1945-1975 (New York: John Wiley & Son, Inc . , 1976), p. 36 
75Bruce Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in 
Near East, p. 335 
76Forrestal Papers, Memorandum of a luncheon with 
William Bullitt, March 10, 1946 Vol 4, p. 920. Forrestal 
remarked that only he and ''Bill~ Bullitt can see the Russians 
for what they really were--bent on world domination. 
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has greatly limited the value of the Straits from a 
strategic _viewpoint . The real Soviet objective towards 
Turkey is not revision of the regime of the Straits, 
but actual domination of Turkey In the vast security 
belt of the Soviet Union .. . Turkey constitutes the sole 
gap. Turkey maintains an independent foreign policy ... 
and this the Soviet Union is unwilling to tolerate. 
The Soviet objective is to break down the present 
independent Turkish Government, and to establish in its 
place, a vassal or 11friendly 11 regime i n Turkey. 77 
Wilson continued to support his contention by stating that, 
had t~e Soviets really desired a simple revision of the 
Montreux agreements, they would have accepted the United 
States proposal of November 2, 1945. Wilson alleged that 
this American plan recognized the privileged position of 
the Soviet Union and other Black Sea powers vis-a-vis the 
Stra1ts and, in essence, granted the Black Sea countries, 
acting in concert, control over the Straits. 78 The American 
plan was, however, perceived by the Soviets as maintaining 
and, in fact, guaranteeing Anglo-American predominance in 
the Eastern Mediterra nean. 
The Soviet Union continued to press Turkey during 
the months following the end of war in Europe, Criticisms 
of the Turkish Government in Soviet press and radio cam-
paigns became more vigorous. 79 Russia also demanded that 
77u. S. Department of State, Papers Relating to 
the Foreign ~elations of the United States, 1946, VII, p. 821. 
Wilson 1 s assessment of the situation in the Eastern Medi-
terranean was consistently anti-Soviet and pro-Turk. · 
78
rbid. 
79stephen Xydis, "American Naval Visits to Greece 
and the Eastern Mediterranean, 1946 11, p . 57 
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Turkey retrocede the provinces of Kar s and Ardahan. 8° Fur-
thermore, in addition to the bilateral agreement on the 
Straits which the Soviets required of Turkey, Russia also 
pressured the Turks for the "positive guarantee " of Russian 
bases on Turkish soii. 81 This war of nerves con t inued~ 
and on December 20, 1945, Soviet authorities sanctioned 
publication of Soviet claims to ten thousand square miles 
of Turkish territory stretching along the southern coast 
of the Black Sea for a distance of one hundred miles west-
82 
ward from the oil port of Batum. 
As the international scene deteriorated, Forrestal 
continued working patiently for the reestablishment of 
the Mediterranean naval force . He felt that power applied 
economically, in advance of a crisis situation, would yield 
disproportionately greater results than allowing the situation 
to deteriorate to the point which would demand the use of 
force . A9ditionally, in early 1946, on the domestic poli-
tical front, Forrestal was faced with another battle to 
stave off drastic Congressional cuts in the Navy's proposed 
80Russ ia had invaded the~e provinces in 1806, 1828, 
1855, and 1877, The first three times she was forced by 
the West to restore her conquests to the Ottoman Empire; 
the last time, she retained possession of then from 1877 
until 1928 . Except for this forty-three year period, the 
districts had been in Turkish possession for hundreds of years. 
81Glbbal News Section, U. S. Naval Institute Pro-
c ee d in g s, _ Fe?ruary 19_46, p . 299 
82Ibid., p. 300 
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budget and further reductions of an already demobilized 
fleet. What was eminently suited to both his international 
strategy and his domestic difficulties was the opportunity 
to prove that the modern Navy had a place in the scheme of 
American global mission. The Russian pressures on Turkey 
and the civil disturbances in Greece had become increasingly 
worrisome concerns for American foreign policy makers. 
Repeated requests by the Turks for some demonstrative token 
of United States interest and involvement in the Straits 
question and by the British for assistance in dealing with 
the riots and disturbances in Greece provided the perfect 
rationale for Forrestal's plans to send the USS Missouri and 
an accompanying task force to the Mediterranean. 
II 
CAAPIBRV 
The United States Navy 
in the Medit erranean, 1946 
The Cruise of the USS Missouri 
to Turkey and Its Impact 
In early February 1946, Forrestal and Admirals 
Chester Nimitz and F~rrest Sherman 83took steps to ensure 
the gradual redeployment of naval forces to the Mediter-
ranean. Forrestal conceived the idea of deploying the 
Eighth Fleet, normally stationed in the Atlantic, into 
the Mediterranean for training maneuvers. The presence of 
the Eighth Fleet in the politically sensitive Eastern Medi-
terranean was meant to act as a deterrent against Soviet 
moves. In a letter to Rear Admiral B. H. Bieri, commander 
Task Force 125 (TF-125), Forrestal briefly discussed his 
rationale for suggesting that the Eighth Fleet conduct its 
spring exercise in the Mediterranean : 
For your information, it is my hope that the Amer-
ican policy will be to have units of the American Navy 
sail in any waters in any part of the globe. I am an-
xious to get this established as a common practice so 
that the move ments of our ships anywhere in the world 
will not be matter for excitement or speculation. It 
83Admiral Chester Nimitz was the Chief of Naval 
Operations and Admiral Forrest Sherman was Deputy Chief 
of Naval Operations for Politico-Military Affairs. 
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was with this in mind that I had first proposed to 
have the 8th Fleet conduct its spring exercises in 
the Mediterranean itself. 84 . 
The opportunity for expanding American naval in-
volvement in the Mediterranean occurred in March 1946. 
This same month which witnessed the Churchill - Stalin ex-
change over the 11Iron Curtain, 11 the crisis over Iran, re -
newed pressure on Turkey, the collapse of the Greek election 
leading to renewed civil conflict also saw the first U. S . 
postwar naval demonstrat · on . In March 1946, the United 
States Government returned the ashes of Mehmet Munir Ertugun, 
the late Turkish Ambassador to the United States, to Turkey 
aboard the "super - battleship II USS Miss ouri. 
Who actually made the decision to utilize the USS 
Missouri to transport the ashes of Ambassad or Ertugun is 
not certain. The choice was indicative, however, of the 
importance attached to the necessity of adequately "showing 
the flag 11 ,in the troubled Eastern Mediterranean . Under 
ordinary circumstances an Air Transport plane or a smaller 
naval unit would have been utilized to return the Ambassador's 
84
walter Mills ; The Forrestal Diaries, p. 184. 
Rear Admiral Biere commanded TF- 125 which included all 
American naval units in the Mediterranean. TF-125 was, in 
turn, part of the 12th Fleet which had previously only op-
erated in Northern European waters but, in 1946, was expanded 
to include all naval · units in Europe. For a schematic re-
presentations of the chain of command for naval forces in 
Eur ope prior to the establishment of the Sixth Fleet, see 
Appendix B. 
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remains to Istanbul. For example, the ashes of Lprd Lothian, 
the fo r mer British Ambassador to the Un~ted States, were 
returned to Britain in late 1945 on board a Navy cruiser, 
85 -
. as protocol demanded. Dean Acheson, the Undersecretary 
of State, wrote Presi dent Tru man in January 1946 that the 
Turkish Ambassador's body be returned in the same manner: 
Oral advice from the Navy indicates that a cruiser 
is available for the voyage to Istanbul and, if , you 
approve, I shall confirm this with the Navy Department 
and offer the Turkish Government transportation ,of the 
Ambassador's remains accordingly. 86 
. 
It is apparent, however, that Forrestal and other Navy of-
ficials pressed for the use of a battleship. The Navy 
Department responded to the State Department inquiry that 
there was a cruiser shortage and that the battleship 
Missouri was the only ship available. Navy spokesmen were 
telling less than the truth: logs of the Norfolk, Virginia 
bas ed cruisers, Houston and Portsmouth indicate that they 
were easi~y available for a cruise to the Mediterranean. 87 
In any case, the choice of the battleship Missouri, symbolic 
of the American defeat of Japan and a mute reminder of the 
85Denn is M. Pricolo, Trident Study No. 95, p. 37 
86Memorandu m for the President from Dean Acheson, 
Reproduced by Captain Guy Cave, USN, The Build-up of U. S. 
Naval Forces in the Mediterranean a s an Instru ment of Cold 
War Policy (Washin gt on : The National War College, 1975), 
p . 85 
87chief of Naval Operations' Ships' Card File, 
Operationa l Archives, U. S. Naval Academy Library, Annapolis, 
Maryland . 
-[ 
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the atomic arsenal of the United States, was a brillant 
piece of calculated showmanship . 88 
The State Department announced on March 6, 1946 
that the body of Ambassador Ertugun would be returned to 
Turkey on board the USS Missour i which would, on the re-
turn trip, call at Piraeus and other Mediterranean ports. 
The announcement received very little play in the press 
until it was disclosed two days later that the Soviet Union 
had formally asked the Turkish Government to cede certain 
districts to it as a precondition for settlement of the 
Straits problem. The significance of the deployment of 
the Missouri then made page one of the New York Times: 
These demands were taken more seriously (in Wash-
ington) than almost any Soviet threat, because any 
attempt to seize these territories by force, it is felt 
here, would lead to war .. . against this background, 
there is considerable interest here in the decision 
to dispatch the new battleship Missouri. 89 
Forrestal had conceived an impressive display when 
he suggested, and apparently received tacit approval, that 
a large part of Vice-Admiral Marc A. Mitscher's Eighth 
Fleet accompany the Missouri into the Mediterranean. The 
d isplay of firepower would be awesome. The elements of 
the Eighth Fleet which would s team in company with the 
88 Robert G. Albion and Robert Connery, Forrestal 
and the Navy, p. 186. One of Forrestal's aides recalled that 
the choice of the Missouri was readily acceptablein part be-
cause Truman came from the state of Missouri. It (the choice) 
was "a piece of calculated salesmanship." 
89New York Ti mes, March 8, 1946, p. 1 
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Missouri were the newly commissioned attack aircraft carrier 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, the attack carrier Midway, several 
cruisers, and a variety of escorts. 90 
Why final approval of this decision to send the 
Eighth Fleet was withdrawn and by whom is not clearly evi-
dent. What is certain, however, is that during the ten 
days between Forrestal's proposal to Secretary Byrnes and 
the State Department announcement of the Missouri's mission, 
Eighth Fleet maneuvers were changed from the Mediterranean 
to the Caribbean. While it may be conjecture that the rapid 
demobilization of the Navy and the need for units in the 
· 91 Far East caused the cancellation, there was also an ideo-
logical dispute involved in the decision. Certain prominent 
Washington officials indicated that they thought that the 
dispatch of so large and powerful a fleet would appear pro-
vocative to the Soviet Union on the heels of Administration 
speeches indicating a tougher policy towards Russia . Others 
felt that the world needed to grasp the ability of the United 
States "to concentrate great sea air power quickly." 92 
90Naval Organization Manual 1946; New York Ti mes, 
March 18, 1946, p. 1 
91This possibility is unlikely for several reasons: 
(1) the Missouri encountered five destroyer s enroute to the 
Uni ted States while she was in the Mediterranean, (2) scant 
five months later, the major units of the Eighth Fleet would 
make virtually the same cruise as did the Missouri earlier. 
92
stephen Xydis, "The American Naval Visit$ to 
Gre ece and the Eastern Mediterranean in 1946", p . 49 
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The American and European press trumpeted the voyage 
of the Missouri as a symbol of American support for Greece 
and Turkey. Walter Lippmann wrote three days following the 
official announcement of the Missouri's mission that: 
As everyone knows, the choice of this ship and the 
timing of its voyage coincide with the mounting crisis 
in the Middle East constitutes a political demonstration. 
This action is meant to show that the United States 
ha s a real, not merely theorectical, interest in the 
Mediterranean, for when a great power sends a battleship 
to a disputed area, in the language of diplomacy that 
means it intends to participate in the settlement. 93 
The Missouri left Bayonne, New Jersey on March 21, 
1946 . It transitted the Straits of Gibraltar on April 1, 
becoming the first American battleship to enter Mediterranean 
waters. 94 The cruiser Providence and the destroyer Power 
joined the Missouri at Naples, and acting under orders from 
the Secretary of the Navy, accompanied the Missouri through 
the Dardanelles. 
The Missouri, the Providence and the Power, accom-
panied by ·three Turkish destroyers, arrived at Istanbul 
on April 5, 1946 . The reception accorded the ship was 
tumultuous. Huge crowds manned Istanbul's Byzantine Wall 
to see the coming of th e "Mighty Mo 11 • "Welcome Missouri 11 
was emblazoned in electric lights on the lighthouse at the 
ent rance to Istanbul harbor . The Naval Attache noted that 
93New York Herald Tribune, March 9, 1946, p . 13 
94 stephen Xydis, "The American Naval Visits to 
Greece and the Eastern Medit erranean in 1946", p. 52 
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11people came from the Eastern pr-ovinces to see the ships, 
and peasants reported traveling fifty mtles to see Admiral 
Hewi tt (officer in ch arge of t he mission) at the stations 
along the route to Ankar a. 1195 To commemorate the visit of 
the Missouri, the Turkish Govern ment issued special Missouri 
sta mps and cigarettes. As long as one year after the visit, 
Rear Admiral Marc In gli ss, Director of Naval Intelligence 
for Europe, reported being bombarded by questions from the 
c ommon people of Turkey concerning the Missouri's visit . 
while on a tour of the Eastern Mediterranean trouble spots.9 6 
U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Edwin Wilson wrote Sec-
retary of State Byrnes that the overwhelming reception given 
the Missouri could be explained by Turkish hopes that the 
United States had established an independent policy in the 
Near and Middle East based on its own interest .s ( apparently 
Wilson assumed ·t hat the Turks preferred American interes -t 
to either British or Russian). Wilson continued to stress 
the importance of the visit: 
Translated i nt o specific terms applying to Turkey 
f ore go ing (the visi t of the Missouri) means to the 
Turks that the US has now decided that its own interest 
in the area require it to oppose any effort by USSR to 
de stro y Turk independence and integrity. This because 
if USSR allowed t o destroy Turk independence and set 
up "friend ly" regime here, nothing could prevent 
95Letters and Di spatches Relating to the Mediter -
ranean Voyage of the Missouri, Operational Archives, U. S. 
Naval Academy Library, Annapolis, Maryland 
96rb i d . 
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Soviets fro m asce nd ing to Suez and once this occurs 
anot her world co nflict beco mes inevitable. 97 
According to American newspaper commentaries con-
cerning the visit, the Turkish Goverment made a concerted 
effort to characterize the Missouri's visit as merely a 
special gesture of goodwill to a friendly country. These 
reports further stated that many Turks were disappointed by 
the State Department denial of the suggestion that the 
battleship's voy~ge was intended to demonstrate American 
support for Turkey against the Soviet Union.9 8 Official 
Turkish statements had -a cautious tone. When the Turkish 
I 
premier, Sukru Saracoglou, was asked whether he considered 
the Missouri 's visit an American show of force against the 
Soviet Union, he stated that the United States has answered 
that question by "stating to the world that it stands with 
the charter .of the United Nations . 1199 
European newspapers linked the USS Missouri's 
presence in Istanbul with President Truman's public state-
ment tha t the Unite d States was t he strongest nation in the 
world and intended to remain so. 100 The British Government 
97 U. S . Depar tme nt of State, Papers Relating to 
th e For e ign Relatio ns of the United States, 1946, VII, p~ 
283 
98New Yor k Ti mes, April 6, 1946, p. 4 
99New Yor k Ti mes, April 7, 1946, p. 3 
lOONew Yor k Ti mes, April 8, 1946, p. 10 
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was particularly interested in American naval visits to the 
Eastern Mediterranean, hoping for as strong a presence as 
possible. Great Britain, suffering severe economic debility, 
required and desired a strong surrogate to protect her in-
terests in the Eastern Mediterranean area. When Winston 
Churchill was informed by Forrestal o_f the deployment of 
the USS Missour i without the company of the Eighth Fleet, 
he stated only that he was disappointed that it had not 
been accorr.panied by a task force because 11a gesture of 
power not fully implemented is almost less effective than 
no gesture at all. 11 Churchill suggested that to make the 
visit diplomatically effective "the entire task force should 
sail into the Sea of Marmara. 11101 
On a visit to England in July 1946, Forrestal had 
occasion to dine with First Lord of the Admiralty A. V. 
Alexander and First Sea Lord Sir John Cunningham. Both 
Cunningha~ and Alexander also expressed disappointment that 
the United States did not "go through with the proposal to 
102 have Mit scher 1 s Eighth Fleet train in the Mediterranean. 11 
The presence of the USS Misso uri in the waters of 
Istanbul at the height of the Soviet pressure upon Turkey 
was a gesture of power underlying not only American 
101 Forrestal Papers, Unpublished Diaries, Vol . 4, 
p. 145. 
l0 2Ibid., p. 1166 . 
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interests in the Near and Middle East but also of a growing 
closeness in Turkish-American relation~ in an area of the 
world where no ground troops were capable of long opposing 
the Soviet Red Army. Furthermore, it was the symbolic 
return of American power to an area which had seen some of 
the first American successes at sea. It was representative 
of the new order, a reversal of l ong-standi ng tradition. 
America _would no longer rely upon British sea power in the 
Mediterranean. The United States, once maritime understudy 
to the world's greatest sea power, had de facto replaced 
her British counterpart. 
The Cruise of the USS Missouri 
to Greece and Its Impact 
The Missouri left Istanbul on April 9, 1946 after 
a highly successful visit. On her return voyage, she was 
scheduled to stop at Piraeus (port of Athens), Algiers, 
Naples, and Tangiers . Of these visits, the most important, 
d iplo mat ically, was Greece. Greece had been under serious 
pressure from the Soviet Union to drop its claims to the 
Dodecanese Islands an d accede to Russian requests for a 
repair base for th e Soviet Merchant Fleet. 103 Severe economic 
di slocatio n within Greece together with the ravages of a 
complex c ivil war made the Greek Government particularly 
susceptible to external pressure, whether those pressures 
103 The Dodocanese Island s, owned by Italy since 
the division of the Ottoman Empire , were clai med by Greece-
be Russian, British, or American. 
Great Britain had traditionally _ maintained a sphere 
104 
of influence in Greece. Faced with · the virtually insur -
mountable problems of maintaining an unpopular, pro - British 
gover~ment, of feeding thousands of starving Greeks and 
of consolidating Greek economic problems, Britain could 
barely maintain order in the war-ravaged country. To under-
stand the situation in Greece, it is first necessary to 
grasp the fragmented and bitter nature of the civil war. 
The king had fled Greece when Germany occupied the country 
in 1941 . He remained in England during the war,establishing 
a government - in - exile. The Greek people organized into 
several .resistance groups - -the ELAS (leftist and intensely 
nationalistic), the EAM (ELAS supporting political organi-
zation), the KKE (the Greek Communist Party), . and the EDES 
(conservative and royalist). The ambigious British policy 
which led. to Englandt to support the ELAS military activities 
against the Germans while opposing its political aims by 
strenthening the pro-Royalist, reactionary elements of the 
EDES caused an intensely chaotic political climate within 
Greece which sporadically exploded into bloody civil war. 
Although initially and officially disinterested, 
the United States began gradually to fill the power vacuum 
left by the British weakness . In December 1945, when the 
104 British interest in Greece largely stem from its 
position as part of the communications and logistics link 
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cruiser Providence made a call at Piraeus, it served to 
focus attention on the power of the United States: 
Everything on the ship symbolizes the tremendous 
power which arises maje stically toward world hegemony. 
America has shown itself not only the first factor of 
the people's freedom. Mistress of the oceans and of 
the seas, she has the power to become the arbiter every 
moment in disputes among nati ons. 105 
This visit was followed by monetary and by other 
tokens of American interest. In January 1946, the United 
States loaned the Greek Government $25 million for the 
purchase of reconstruction goods. Another loan followed 
in February for $10 million for the purchase of surplus 
army goods and in March, another $45 million for surplus 
. 106 American vessels. 
Greek governmental instability continued to in-
crease in the early month s of 1946. The Soviet Union 
continued to request bases on Greek-claimed territory; 
the leftist and communist rebels continued to attack the 
existing ~ro-Western government (aided in part by Yugoslavia). 
The United States and Great Britain viewed Tito and Yugo-
slavia as puppets of the Soviet Union and, therefore, saw 
the hand of Moscow in the repeated rounds of Greek civil 
with the ·11jewel of the British Empire", India. 
l05Estia, December 8, 1945, p. 1. (quoted in Xydis, 
"The American Naval Visits to Greece .-and the Eastern Medi -
terranean 11, p. 77). 
106 Department of State Bulletin, XIV, February 3, 
1946, p. 155. 
war. The United States and Great Britain feared that the 
Soviet Union would succeed in placing a . leftist government 
in power in power in Greece after the royal plebicite in 
September 1946. It was with this in mind that the Amer ican 
Embassy in Athens sent a co mmunication to the Royal Ministry 
f or Foreign Affairs "to ask whether the Royal Hellenic 
Governm ent would be agreeable to receiving a visit from 
the USS Missouri from April 10 to April 13 accompanied by 
107 
a destroyer. l! The Greek Government consented to the 
visit, obviously quite pleased with the renewal of American 
108 interest in Greece. 
The Missouri's visit to Athens was more exuberant . 
than that to Istanbul. The great battleship was accompanied 
by her two escorts, Providence and Power, a Turkish destroyer 
and two Greek destroyers. Admiral Hewitt had visited Athens 
before as a Passed Midsh ipman (a Midshipman who graduated 
from Annapolis and was waiting for an opening in the Ensigns' 
list) _on the old battleship Missouri during the cruise of 
the Great White Fleet. The Greek Government was made well 
aware of this fact by the American Embassy and , consequently, 
Hewitt was treated with particular accord. 109 
l07stephen Xydis, !!The American Naval Visits to 
Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in 1946", p. 85. 
108 
Ibid., pp. 86-87. 
109
Admiral H. K. Hewitt Oral History Transcript, 
Special Collections Section, U. S. Naval Academy Library, 
Annapol is, Maryland . 
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Though Russian pressure for territorial concessions 
and leftist threats from civil war must . have b.een uppermost 
in the minds of Greek politicians, none contradicted Hewitt's 
statement that the visit o~ the Missouri was simply a cour-
tesy visit, not a political one aimed at the Soviets. The 
Greek press, however, was not as restrained as had been the 
Turkish press nor as was the Greek Government in ascribing 
political motives behind the visit. From newspapers on the 
far right to those on the far left, the political signifi-
cance of the visit of the American warships dominated the 
110 
reports and editorials. 
Some newspapers were cautiously political. Ethnos, 
a conservative paper, noted that . "the Missouri is one of 
the sedatives of the warlike neurosis which troubles tired 
human ity after a few months of peace." The ultra-royalist 
evening paper Akropolis bluntly ~discussed the political 
motives or the visit: 
Touch wood, our Ambassador in Washington does not 
die like our Turkish colleague. Thus, the arrival of 
the American colossus (the Missouri) at Piraeus does 
not have the same tran sparent justification as its 
trip to Istanbul. However , the motives and the purpose 
of the visit are the same: Around us here and in the 
Balkans hovers the g reat Russian shadow. So the Ameri-
can comes here, too, to tell us : "hold tight, and you 
may be sure we are with you. 
The leftists papers ' commentaries on the visit of 
llOAll Greek newspaper quotations may be found in 
Stephen Xyd is, "The American Naval Visits to Greece and 
the Eastern Mediterranean, 1946", pp. 89-111. Mr. Xydis 
served as a Greek consular official in the United States. 
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the Mi ssouri differed complete ly in tone and content from 
those at t0e other end of the political . spectrum. The of-
ficial newspaper of the leftist party, the EAM, chose to 
ignore completely the visit; the KKE paper welcomed "with 
joy the men and officers of the Great American Republic" 
but expressed unease at the "unconcealed imperialistic 
interests" of the United States in the postwar period. 
The Greek people flocked to see the battleship, 
the symbol of America's victory in the Pacific. On April 
11 and 12, for four hours each day, the warship was open 
to one thousand visitors each day, but only those with 
special invitations. The crowds without invitations who 
simply went to gaze upon the American ships were ~n credibly 
large, causing one Greek writer to remark that "the Misso 'uri 
will remain unforgettable to those who saw ity but unforget-
t b t t th h t t ·t b t d'd 't rrlll a le oo, o ose w o wen o see 1 ... u 1 n . 
T0e USS Missouri, during its four day visit to 
Athens, received a welcome of considerable warmth by the 
government officials, the press, and the people. Even the 
Communist newspaper ackn owl e dged this visit by greeting the 
American warship warmly, . although gently disapproving of 
American fore~gn poli cy trends. The Missouri 's vi~it to 
Greek waters had all the hallmarks of an act of pure prestige. 
111 stephen Xydis, "The American Naval Visits to 
Greece and the Easter n Mediterranean", p. 89 
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Political allusions can barely be read between the lines 
of official pronouncements of either government. Indeed, 
all statements by the Greek Government alluded to further 
economic aid from the United States rather than direct 
military assistance. 
Great Britain required American naval assistance 
to counter Soviet moves in the Near and Middle East . It 
is uncertain, however, whether the Soviet Union viewed these 
U. S. maneuvers as threatenin g . Soviet news sources in-
itially ignored the American naval presence in the Mediter-
ranean. In fact, although the voyage of the Missouri could 
be characterized as blatant "gunboat diplomacy, 11 the Soviet 
Union made no mention of the Missouri for three weeks 
following her visits. However, Rizospastis, a radical 
Greek Communist newspaper, attacked not only the visit of 
•the Missouri but also what it called American "atom diplo-
macy," thus betraying an awareness of the atomic power 
symbolized by the Missouri. 
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When the Soviet press finally recognized that a 
major United States warship had been cruising the Eastern 
Mediterranean, criticism was directed not at the United 
Stat es but at Turk ey a n d Gr eece. Choosing to place the 
visit in the most favorable light possible, the Soviet 
112 stephen Xydis., "The American Naval Visits to 
Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean, 11 p. 106. Xydis con-
tended th at Ri zospastis was operati n g under orders fro m 
Moscow. 
state paper Izves tiya chided the Turks for placing too 
great an emphasis on political implications of the visit. 
The Soviet attitude was expressed thus: 
Take it easy, Turks. Don ' t make a sensation, a 
boom, out of the Missouri's visit to Istanb~l. Remem-
ber the original plan had been to send the whole Eighth 
Fleet there. The visit was just what it was said to 
be: a normal courtesy visit to return the body of the 
Turkish Ambassador to Washington . It was due no pol-
itical consideration. 113 
In further attempts to reduce the morale-building effects 
of the visit on both Greece and Turkey, Moscow radio, in 
vernacular broadcasts, dismissed ·as "saber-rattling" ad-
vocacy in certain American newspapers of the "need for 
protecting United States interests in all corners of the 
globe, even as far as the Mediterranean. 11114 
Regardless of how the Soviets attempted to reduce 
the impact of the Missouri's visit to the Eastern Mediter-
ranean, it did, in fact, prompt a vitrolic response little 
more· than a month later. During a dinner at the Soviet 
Embassy for Secretary of- State Byrnes and a few advisors, 
the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Andrei Vishinsky, 
made an acidic attack upon American "imperialist expansion" 
and charged that t he United States was seeking military 
bases in Turkey, Greece and Egypt--the very countries 
115 
which were on the itinerary of the Missour i's voyage. 
113 111 Ibid., p. 
114 Ibid., p. 109 
llSibid ·., p. 110 
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It appeared t hat the voyage of the Missouri did 
precipitate other tangible accomplishments. In addition to 
provoking Soviet outbursts, for example, shortly after the 
Missouri's visit, the Turk~sh crisis defused and Soviet 
troops were withdrawn from the border . As Forrestal re-
marked before a Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
March 13, 1947: 
Last summer, when the Russians began making their 
representations to Turkey on the Dardanelles, the ap-
pearance of American war vessels on the Mediterranean 
were followed by the first amiable utterances of 
Premier Stalin. 116 
More than simply defusing the current crisis in the 
Near and Middle East, however, the Missouri initiated the 
reeme r gence of the United States Navy in power in an area 
of the .world which many began to perceive as vital to the 
national interests of the United States. C. _ L. Sulzberger, 
in a feature article in the New York Times, spotlighted 
this emerging realization that the United States could no 
longer rely upon Great Britain to protect Western interests 
in that area: 
... t he triangle rou gh l y bordered by the Adriatic, the 
Caspian, and the Red Sea (are) where the vital interests 
of the United Stat e s, Great Britain, and the Union of 
Soviet Socialists Republic meet. The actual frontier 
of wha t mi ght be te r med the present spheres of _ interest 
runs along the northern boundaries of Greece and Turkey, 
t he eastern borders of Turkey and somewhere through 
the middle of Iran, i n th e vicinit y of the zone fixed 
116Forrestal Papers, Vol. 1, No. 1534 (Memorandum 
of Rema rk s made befo r e Senate Fo r ei gn Relations Commit tee, 
March 13, 19L~7) . 
71 
by Britain and Russia in 1907. 
There are three basic reasons for the vital inte -
rests in this large area. These are, in order of 
importance; (1) national security, (2) international 
political i mifluence, (3) petroleum . 117 
Sulzberger went on to list the specific reasons for the 
United States interests in the area . The United States 
had vital air bases in the Middle East, specifically in 
Dharan. Furthermore, the important strategic oil reserves 
were in Saudi ~rabia, and it was in the national interests 
of the United States to prevent the formation of any zone 
of political influence there, "commanded and controlled by 
118 
any other power . " Using the allusion of a pie, Sulzberger 
characterized Greece, Turkey, and Iran as the crust of the 
Middle Eastern pie--the only countries of sufficient strength 
to resist Soviet pressures . The remaining Middle East was 
viewed as "soft as mush all the way down to the Suez. 11119 
Sulzberger proposed that the United States assist in making 
the "crust" stronger in order to prevent the penetration 
of the Soviet Union to the Red Sea . 120 
The cruise of the "Mighty Mo" served as a warning 
117c . L. Sulzber?ier, 11Steady Soviet Pressure Ex -
pected in the Near East, ' New Yor k Times, April 17, 1946, 
p. 6 
118 
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to the Soviets that the U. S. viewed the Soviet Union as 
having reached the outer boundaries of its expansion and 
that the United States would consider further moves as 
going bey ond legitimate and acceptable Soviet interests. 
Furthermore, the consolidation of American global pre-
dominance dictated that a perceptible and powerful image 
of United States' military might be projected in all 
corners of the globe. The cruise of the Missouri provided 
just such a demonstration. The acclamation received by 
the visit from all quarters- - British , Turkish, and Greek 
Governments -- and the attention directed by the Soviet Union 
to the cruise set the stage for new demonstrations of 
American prestige and power in the Eastern ·Mediterranean . 
CHAPTER VI 
The Build-up of U. S. Naval Forces 
in the Mediterranean 
For two months following the Missouri voyage, Am-
erican naval operations in the Mediterranean reverted to 
their previous low level of activity . Rear Admiral Bernard 
Bieri, who took command of TF- 125 in June 1946, was given 
no orders save a vague directive to support U. S . occupa-
tion forces in Europe. Bieri continually asked the State 
Department for directives concerning the effective uses 
of the naval presence in the Mediterranean . Forrestal 
lamented in July 1946 that: 
The State Department is inclined to stand aloof 
from military people and to be unaware of the very 
great influence that the Navy in particular can exercise 
in Europe. Its prestige is high, the record of its 
accomplishments in the Pacific is widely kn own and its 
personnel in general have been disciplined and of good 
conduct whenever they have been in contact with Europeans. 
The Navy people need directions if they are to be 
effective. 121 
In July when Forrestal again suggested that the 
United States send casual cruisers unannounced into the 
Mediterranean for the purpose of establishing the custom 
of flying the flag in those waters, Secretary of State 
121 Forrestal Papers, Unpublished Diaries, No. 1534, 
Memorandum of Meetin g with Chief of Naval Intelligence 
f or Europe,July 20, 1946. 
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Brynes agreed. The impressive reception of the Missouri 
and her escorts had convinced Byrnes that the naval displays 
were an important component of the diplomatic maneuvering 
which was taking place in Europe. 
Forrestal had persisted in pressing the issue of 
establishing a standing naval force in the Mediterran~an 
because he feared that the Soviet Union could initiate an 
incident which would require the United States to back up 
its diplomatic notes with force. He commented that: 
The State Department love to run the ball until 
it gets too hpt to handle . Then, without calling the 
signals, it is swiftly passed to the military, who 
are then expected to make a touchdown. 122 
He further requested Admiral James Ramsey, Deputy Chief of 
Naval Operations, to prepare a brief of U. S. capabilities 
in the event of hostilities in Europe. The brief showed 
the Navy to be dangerously unprepared to meet mission re -
quirements in the event of conflict. Demobilization had so 
reduced tne number of personnel in the Navy that 11a very 
large number of vessels in the act ive · fleet cannot go to 
123 
sea because of the lac k of competent personnel." 
Forrestal wasted little time in arranging imple -
122
walter Mills , The Forrestal Diaries, p . 190 
123 Forrestal Papers, Unpublished Diaries No. 1222; 
Memorandum of. a Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, August 22, 
1946 . Forrestal also noted that the fleet oiler Catoctin 
had to borrow personnel in order to shift piers and even 
then, a minor accident occurred. 
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mentation of Byrnes' permission to send additional ships 
to the Med iterranea n . He ordered the a~tack carrier Frank -
lin D. Roosevelt, the cruiser Little Rock, and the destroyer 
escorts Cone, New, Corry, Noa, and Warrington -- hardly the 
"casual" approved by Byrnes- - to ·make calls in major Mediter -
ranean ports. The press release announcing the deployment 
stated that the visits were at ~he expr ~ssed request o\ 
the State Department "as an insurance against civil distur-
bances in Greece." 124 However, the Navy Department apparently 
had considerable responsibility for the decision to send 
the Roosevelt and her escorts. A dispatch, from Admiral 
Connolly, Commander TF-125, to Forre~tal, requested the 
presence of the American warships, part.icularly the 11FDR 11 
which he indicated would be 11a tremendously helpful and 
stabilizing influence." 12 5 ~ 
The Roosevelt's reception in Athens was not nearly 
as festive as that given the Missouri five months earlier. 
In addition to continued Russian pressure for concessions, 
the Greeks had endured five months of new civil war and the 
Greek .economy was in shambles. Greece was spiritually ex-
hausted and once again the United States Government 
124 New York Times, August 27, 1946, p. 4. Russian 
spokesmen accused the United States of attempting to influence 
the voting in the Greek plebiscite by such a conspicuous 
display of power. The visit of the - Roosevelt rec~ived such 
w~de play in the press day s before the election . The Roosevelt 
had been used a few months earlier to 11impress 11 the Portuguese 
out of their leftist leanings. 
12
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officially denied that the visit could be more than simple 
courtesy call. 
Following so quickly on the heels of the Missouri's 
visit to Istanbul and Athens, the political significance 
of the port calls of the Roosevelt and her escorts (desig-
nated by the Navy as Carrier Division One) received wide -
spread attention from the press, despite State and Navy 
efforts to downplay the political aspects of the deployment. 
Items in both national and international newspapers reiterated 
that the build-up of American naval forces in European 
waters was part of a deliberate plan to reinforce American 
diplomacy by shows of strength. 126 The New York Times 
commented upon the visit thus : 
The FDR, largest and most powerful plane carrier in 
the world ... is headed for Greece as a gesture of 
friendship on a routine training cruise. Officially, 
it is pure coincidence that the Roosevelt will anchor 
at what happens to be the height of the Yugoslav and 
Bulgarian pressure on Greece, but our ships do manage 
toge~ around those European trouble spots. 127 
The Roosevelt's voyage was intended to intimidate 
the Soviet Union. However, the United States attempted 
to allow the So"viets some maneuvering room in its interpre-
tation of the cruises. Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson 
denied to the press that the cruise of the Roosevelt was 
meant to be anything e~se but a goodw ill visit to the 
126 
1946, 26 New York Ti mes, August 29, p. 
127N ew York Times, August 28, 1946, p. 3 
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Ea stern Mediterranean . Nevertheless, there was no doubt 
in either Moscow or Washington exactly ~hy Roosevelt was 
128 
making her Mediterranean circuit. 
The visits hardly went unnoticed in the European 
press or within European governments. French newspapers 
commented on the importa nce that the United States attached 
to Near East oil fields, making a clear connection between 
the Soviet demands in the area and the renewal of American 
presence in the Mediterranean. The English, on the other 
hand, expressed both public and private pleasure at the idea 
of the American naval demonstrations, even to the point 
of lamenting that the demonstrations had not been on a 
grander scale. However, while supporting the American 
initiative, they also took pains to ensure that British 
vessels were in Piraeus when the Missouri and . the Roosevelt 
visited Greece in order that the Union Jack be as con-
spicuously present as was the Stars and Stripes. 129 
The reactions of the Navy Department officials in-
dicated that the forces in the Mediterranean were not te m-
porary in nature. Acting Chief of Naval Oper at ions deWitt 
Clinton Ramsey a sser ted that although aggression was the 
farthe st thing from the Navy 's mind, the Medite rranean 
128New York Ti mes, August 28, 1946, p. 2 
l 29stephen Xydis, "The American Naval Visits to 
Greece and the Eastern Medi terranean in 1946", pp. 123-137 
was a free sea and the Navy would not be kept from carry-
ing out its mission due to allegation s by other powers 
that its presence in th~ area was an attempt to influence 
events. Admiral William "Bull" Halsey bluntly stated, 
during a press conference on board the Roosevelt in Naples 
harbor, that: 
Freedom of the seas is one of the oldest policies 
of the Government of the United States of America has 
maintained since its inception. We demand the right 
to go anywhere at any time. It is nobody's damn 
business where we go . We can go anywhere we please . . . 
we shall continue to demand the freedom of the seas 
remain unrestricted. 130 
The American press continued t o carry stories con-
cerning the naval movements in the Mediterranean, commenting 
in detail about their anti-Soviet character . Admiral 
Ca ss ady, Commander Carrier Divi s ion One, granted an inter -
view in Naples in which he stated 
... that the plan of the American squadron's Mediter-
ranean trip, _which the Navy Department worked out in 
collaboration with the State Department, originated 
in part at least, from the desire to protect the 
distant frontiers of the United States . 131 
Admiral Cassady also intimated that the Roosevelt carried 
a cer .tain secret weapon (the A-bomb?), but certainly "not 
132 for aggressive purposes." 
l30New York Times, August 29, 1946, p . 1 
131
stephen Xydis, "The American Naval Visits to 
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These comments caused such a furor amid European 
diplomatic circles that Forrestal, duripg a SWNCC meeting, 
recommended that 
all task force commanders going into foreign waters be 
briefed on the political situation in those areas and 
that (those commanders) be instructed to grant no 
interviews except on specific questions which should 
be written out and given to them before answering . 
He further requested that the Navy be authorized to prepare 
an abstract, without attribution to the State Department, 
of American policy in these areas . 133 
On September 5, World Report carr i ed a detailed 
analysis of U. S . diplomatic and naval activities in the 
European area : 
The United States is making her largest show of 
force since the war's end. This is being done by 
diplomatic notes calling Yugoslavia and Poland to ac-
count for policies the United States does not like, 
by diplomatic action asserting an American interest 
in control of Europe's waterways, and by sending the 
largest United States fleet in peacetime into the 
Mediterranean ... . The objectives of all this American 
actio~ is to check Soviet expansion . 
United States Naval power, now in the Mediterranean, 
is on display to re-enforce United States State Depart-
ment notes on the issue of waterways, particularly the 
Dardanelles. The aircraft carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt 
i s showin g the flag east of Gibraltar, while in London 
Admiral Marc Mitscher, commander of the Twelfth Fleet, 
says that the United States will maintain an enlarged 
fleet in the Mediterranean for some time t o come . 134 
133Forrestal Papers, Unpublished Diaries, Vol 5, -
·No. 1237, Memorandum of a SWNCC Meeting of September 4, 1946 . 
13411us Displa y s Force in Europe to Check Russian 
Exp an sio n : Diplomatic Moves and Fleet Serve as Warning", 
World Report, I, 5 September 1946, pp. 5- 6 
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The United States News commented on the role of 
the warships _ i n the Mediterranean : . 
Regardless of its outcome, the role of Carrier Div-
isio n One as the country's "big stic k " i n the Mediter-
ranean sets th e pattern for employment of the Navy in 
United States diplomacy in the coming years ... This 
country ha s again begun to u se its powerful naval forces 
a s a "bi g stic k " in its relati ons with other nat ions, 
notably Russia. U. S. warships now i n the Mediterranean 
may play a profou nd role i n the out pome of the present 
tense situatio n there. In any case, they are proof 
that the U. S. means to back up its diplomacy with a 
display of military force. 135 
The Soviets had general ly avoided any direct mention 
of the appearance of the U. S. Navy in force in the Medi-
terranean. Howeyer, the political implications of Carrier 
Divisio n One were impossible to ignore. The announced 
schedule of port calls for the Roosevelt and her escorts 
had to appear coercive to the Russians, especially following 
so rapidl y after the delivery of a strong American note on 
the Soviet conditions for renegot iatio n of the Montreux 
Conventio~. 136 The Soviet press strongly criticize d t he 
"gang st er diplomacy " of the new round of U. s. Naval demon-
strations, commenting that the United States ships threaten 
waters of the Mediterranean, Norwegian and Baltic Seas, 
"which have no connexion ( sic) with the defense of the 
United States of Americ a itself . 11137 
135 "Our Na val I Big Stick ' Abroad: A Warning Agains .t 
Aggression "., U. S . News., September 13, 1946., pp. 22-23 
136 Stephen Xydis, 11The Ameri ca n Naval Visits to 
Greece and the Eastern Medi terranean in 1946 11., p. 152 
137 Ibid ., p.165 
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Th e Soviet state newspaper Izvestiya commented upon 
the presence of the Roosevelt in Greek ~aters thus: 
It is doubtful whether the Greek or other peoples 
will show greater reverence for the late President, if 
h e appears to them in the guise of an air~raft carrier. 
This ship is at s ea for an entirely different, a non-
Rooseveltian policy ... remote from the goodwill about 
which Mr . Acheson spoke. 138 
Further statements in the Soviet press continued to stress 
the expansive nature of the American Naval visits. . A Soviet 
Rear Admiral wrote Pr ae vda that 
America is intendi ng to maintain a permanent squadron 
in these waters (the Mediterranean), although she does 
not possess a single patch of territory on the shores 
of the Mediterranean . America 's desire to stress her 
interests in the Mediterranean is indicated by the 
demonstrative visits to ports in that Sea which are 
being made with increasin g frequency of late by American 
warships, · sometimes by whole squadr~ns. 139 
The visit of the Roosevelt to Athens provoked such 
a response from the Soviet press for several reasons. The 
ship itself, the largest aircraft carrier in the world, was 
an impressive demonstration . On her decks, one hundred 
twenty - three planes -- attack bombers, dive bombers, fighters --
were undeniable evidence of the reach of American sea air 
power . 140 However, it was the psychological impact of the 
138Ibid., p. 158 
139Ibid . , p. 162 
140 The U. S. sought and the Greek Government granted 
permi ssion for an air parade of all 123 airplanes from the 
Roosevelt . The fl y - by wa s cancelled abruptly, and press 
speculation i nd icate d that there was concern in State De-
partment circles that such a demonstration would have ap -
peared provocative . 
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n aval presence that was not lost either on American stra-
tegists or on Russian propagandists . Comments in an Ameri-
ca n periodical accurately identified the thrust of the 
naval visits: 
What the Navy will do in case of aggression by 
Russia or Yugoslavia is less important than the psycho-
lo g ical effect of its presence there. If hostilities 
broke out, guns and planes of these ships could be 
used effectively against only coastal targets .... 
Effects of these maneuvers on the delicate questions 
of Palestine, Egypt, and Greece, and on the more explo-
sive situation in . the Dardanelles, the Middle East oil 
fields and Trieste, will largely depend on Soviet 
reaction on the psychological effect of such visible 
American power. 141 
141 u. S. News, September 13, 1946, p. 23 
CHAPTER VII 
The Establishment of the United 
States Sixth Fleet 
Throughout · 1946, Forrestal continued to work to-
wards the establishme nt of a permanent naval squadron in 
the Mediterranean Sea. The obvious diplomatic successes 
of the Missouri, the Roosevelt, and the other "casual 
cruisers" provided hard evidence for Forrestal's fight to 
construct a relevant postwar Navy. Two weeks following 
the resignation of Secret ary of Commerce Henry Wallace 142 , 
Forrestal issued a state ment acknowledging publicly the 
political purpose of the naval movements in the Mediterranean 
and formally establishing a permanent naval commitment in 
those waters. Forrestal was so pleased with the culmination 
of his efforts to reestablish the credibility of the Navy 
that he troubled to enter the statement in his diary: 
The gist of it was: Units of the American Fleet 
have been in the Mediterranean and will continue to be 
there in the future to (1) support American forces in 
Europe, (2) carry out American policy and diplomacy, 
(3) for purposes of experience, morale, and education 
of personnel of th e fleet . 143 
142
wallace had been · the leading advocate within the 
Truman Administrat ion of a conciliatory attitude towards the 
Soviets . His departure signalled increasing U.S. belligerency. 
143 Forrestal Paper s, Vol.2, No. 1233 of September 
30, 1946. 
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Elements of Forrestal 's statement were contained 
in a top secret report written by the Office of the Chief 
of Naval Operations in July 1946 regarding the creation of 
a permanent naval presence i n the Mediterranean: 
Certainly as long as we have troops in Europe, and 
probably as long thereafter as the present Soviet 
policies remain unchanged we should maintain in the 
Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean an adequate Naval 
Force capable of rapid reinforcement from the Western 
Atlantic. The reinforcements would include carrier 
elements. It is recommended that no U. S. bases be 
permanently established due to the difficulties in 
protecting them . Utilization of existing British naval 
ports should be sufficient. 144 
The United States Navy clearly was preparing to assume the 
former British role as the preeminent power in the Mediter-
ranean on the apparent assumption that the British would 
willingly step aside. 
American newspapers welcomed Forrestal's statement 
· 145 
as a "fir m and clear statement of naval policy" and a 
"formal expression of the politico - military policy being 
pur su ed by the (Truman) Administration. Its mission is 
avowedly the support of American rights and interests in 
146 
those vital matters ." Forrestal h imself viewed the naval • 
144 cNO Top Secret Rep ort dated 23 July 1946--Further-
more, an intelligence •message dtg 141258z Feb 46 from Assis-
tant Naval Attache Tur key discu ss ed the perceptions of the 
Soviets that British bases at Malta and Cyprus were being 
turned over to the United States. 
torial . 
145 New York Times, October 1, 1946, editorial 
146 New York Herald Tribune, October 1, 1940, edi-
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policy he had constructed as extraordinarily productive: 
"the appearance of American war vessels . in the Mediterranean 
was followed by the first amiable utterances of Premier 
Stalin. 11147 
The policy was immediately implemented. At the 
beginning of 1946, there were only three U. S. warships in 
the Mediterranean . By February 1947, one year after the 
original cruise of the Missouri , a total of two aircraft 
carriers, the Randolph and the Roosevelt, seven cruisers, 
among them the Providence and t'he Little Rock, eighteen 
destroyers, and four auxiliary ships were present in the 
Mediterranean and had made port visits to all ports of any 
148 
size or consequence, a total of over forty ports . 
In early 1947, the American naval units were still 
organized as Task Force 125 (also designated U. S. Naval 
For ces, Mediterranean) under Admiral Bieri. In January 
1947, TF-~25 was considerably strengt hened by the inclusion 
of an Amphibious Task Group complete w~th a Marine Amphibious 
Unit (MAU). The American Naval presence in the Mediterranean 
now had the capability of intervening with land forces, 
that is, the capability of projecting power ashore. This 
amphibious force normally rotated between the United States 
99 - 110 
. 
147walter Mills, The Forrestal Diarie s, p. 231 
148 nennis M. Pricolo, Trident Study No. 95, pp. 
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and the Mediterranean every four month s. The carriers 
cruised the Mediterranean for two or t~ree months, while 
cruisers and destroyers remained six months before return -
ing to the United States. 14 9 
Of additional significance for the U. S . Navy in 
the Mediterranean was the choice in January 1948 of Vice -
Admiral Forrest Sherman as the new Mediterranean commander . 
The choice of Sherman as head of the Navy's Mediterranean 
arm was truly indicative of the Navy's commitment to remain 
in strength in the Mediterranean . The press was quick to 
point this out, noting that Sherman had been in s trumental 
in bringing the case for a strong Navy to the Congress and 
to the public . Furthermore, he had headed the strategic 
board which had developed War Plan PINCHER and had been 
selected to present it to President Truman . 150 In many ways, 
Sherman was Forrestal's extension in the development of a 
permanent. naval commitment to the Mediterranean . Sherman 
was consistently present whenever Forrestal was required 
to defend the Navy ' s presence in the Mediterranean . It 
was Sherman who emphasized that there was a direct relation-
ship between the success of the European Recovery Program 
and the maintenance of a strong naval force-in - being, 
14 9Ibid. 
150
rbid. 
particularly in the Mediterran ean--a so mewhat extreme state-
ment but neverthele ss indicative of Sherman's intense dedi-
cation to maintaining a strong, vigorous Navy in Mediter -
ranean waters. 
Realizing that the increased importance of Task 
Force 125 (as well as the fact that TF-125 was one of the 
premier naval force s in the world), it was renamed the 
Sixth Task Fleet on July 1, 194 8. On February 12, 1950, 
the American Naval force in the Mediterranean was officially 
designated the "United States Sixth Fleet." Along with the 
Seventh Fleet, it constitutes the two main naval forces 
continuously deployed in forward areas. 
The United States Navy owes its considerable pre-
sence in the Mediterranean and, indeed, in the rest of the 
world's waters to James V. Forrestal. An aide described 
Forrestal's role in establishing this formidable extension 
of United States power thus: 
Forr estal, old boxer that he was, exercised his 
consummate skill at political infighting and event-
ually succeeded in getting his Task Force into the 
Mediterranean . 151 
151 Robert Albion and Robert Connery, Forrestal 
and the Navy , p. 168 
CHAPTER VIII 
Conclusion 
The establishment of the U. S. Sixth Fleet in the 
Mediterranean demonstrated a successful application of 
naval presence in peacetime. The naval demonstration was 
expressly designed to deter the Soviet Union from further 
encroachment in the Mediterranean and to align the power 
realities in the Mediterranean to America's best interests. 
When the American Navy entered the Mediterranean in f o rce 
in September 1946, it represented a departure from tradi-
tional maritime power relationships. The Mediterranean 
had been a "British Lake 11 for over one hundred fifty years; 
thus, the presence of British naval force-in-being was 
considered routine. Entering the Mediterranean in April 
1946 with 'the battleship Missouri, the symbol of America's 
victory over Japan (and by implication, of the American 
possession of the atomic bomb) was a high visibility gesture 
by the United States. To the world, and especially to the 
principal nations concerned (Greece, Turkey, Great Britain 
and the Soviet Union) this U. S. incursion into the Medi -
terranean with a standing naval force was a radical departure 
from previous American diplomatic policy, and accordingly, 
it represented an American involvement in peacetime European 
88 
affairs, an action previously avoided. 
This prepositioning of American Naval forces in the 
Mediterranean during peacetime also represented the global 
character of American national interests and security con-
cerns. With the realization that American wartime strategy 
under a PINCHER scenario was entirely dependent upon Middle 
East oil f ields, the need to establish firmly American 
hegemony in the area was clearly imperative. 
The conjunction of _ the deteriorating geopolitical 
siutation in the Eastern Mediterranean with the postwar 
search for a viable mission for the United States Navy was 
a fortunate circumstance for naval advocates--notwithstanding, 
the leadership of James Forrestal. In 1945 and 1946, the 
U. S. Navy was fighting for its very survival. Its apparent 
obsolescence in the atomic world was the crucial point upon 
which its continuance pivoted. The Middle East, Turkish 
Straits and Greek crises of 1946 provided Naval leaders 
with a stage upon w~ich to prove their merit. 
Retrospective assassments of the Missouri's visit, 
its perceived significance, and its net effects illustrate 
that a flexible, mobile naval force is as effective in 
preventing conflict as it is in fighting battles. The threat 
to _Turkey in 1946 came from an impressive Red Army massed 
on its borders not from nava l guns aimed at Istanbul. The 
USS Missouri was not intended to alter the local balance 
90 
of power but t o convince the Soviet Union that Turkish 
aut onomy was i n the best intere s ts of the United States 
and would be guaranteed by the presence of American Naval 
ve ssels along the Tur kis h littoral . 
It would be difficult to exaggerate the sig n ifica nce 
of the permanent commitment of American Naval forces to 
the Mediterranean arena . By its naval presenc e the United 
States was signalling the Soviet Union and the rest of 
Europe that it would be continuously and directly involved 
in the conduct of European affairs . Furthermore, the dis-
pa tch of these naval vessels must be viewed as the first 
major military action of the Cold War, an action taken 
lo ng before the issuance of the Truman Doctrine, the Berlin 
Airlif .t, and the formation of NATo.152 Irrespective of the 
regional tensions which may ha ve acted as stimuli for the 
creation of the Sixth Flee t, there was behind it a global 
purpose : the preservation of American prestige worldwide 
and the tangible suppor t for one of the basic premises of 
United States diplo macy--the inviolability of the Open Door. 
The crui ses of U. S . Navy warships in the Mediterranean Sea 
during thi s cruc i al period were, therefore, official, non -
verbal but eloquent reminders of the global reach of Amer ican 
power . 
l 52 The Iranian Crisis occurred prior to the voyage 
of the USS Miss ouri; however , since military forces were not 
introduced into Ir an to defu se the crisis, t he s tatement that 
the Missouri's vo yage and that of th e Roosevelt were the first 
major military actions of the Cold War stands. 
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APPENDIX B 
The Chain of Command for U. S . Naval Forces, 
Mediterranean 
Pr ior to the Establishment of the 
U. S. Sixth Fleet 
ALLIED 
I 
SACMED 
Supre me Al lied Commander 
Medi terr anean 
I 
CINCNAVMED 
Commander-in - Chief, Naval 
Forces, Mediter ranean 
colNAVMED 
Commander, Naval Force s 
Mediterranean 
N in MED 
92 
USN 
l CNO 
Chief of Naval 
Opertions 
COMNAVEU 
Command er, Naval 
Forces, Europe 
· Jth Fl eet 
I 
Ta sk Force 125 
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